## 1

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government

The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Prohibitions are laws

Collins Dictionary. "Prohibition definition and meaning". Accessed: 9-13-2021. https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/prohibition

Definition of 'prohibition'

prohibition

(proʊɪbɪʃən)

Word forms: plural prohibitions

1. COUNTABLE NOUN

A prohibition is a law or rule forbidding something.

...a prohibition on discrimination. [+ on]

...prohibitions against feeding birds at the airport. [+ against]

2. See also prohibit

#### The core antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that increases prohibitions on private sector business practices by expanding the scope of the core antitrust laws

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. Fairness – the Neg should win on average 50 percent of the time – any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose – their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Rigorous testing – debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third and fourth line responses – that’s key to politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs – their interp explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

## 2

### World Systems

#### Debate is distinct from academia---deliberation starts with the timer and ends with the ballot. The assumption the ballot has political force to remedy violence is bourgeois ideology---to think that ballots change material conditions is inseparable from magical voluntarism

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification . . . of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist—welling up close to its core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling magical voluntarism fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations. In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s millions of readers. Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classical Marxism), we are mutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in Run Lola Run,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (phronesis) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide . . . agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency . . . [which] opens up opportunities for innovating . . . in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.

#### The quest to reinvent our debate curriculum holds the promise of a new more democratic future. However, the only way forward is to nourish a radically collective imagination that challenges the biopolitics of neoliberalism. That must start with a rejection of their disdain for the state because a successful curriculum inquiry demands the reconstitution our democratic commons.

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INTRODUCTION: CURRICULUM INQUIRY IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM

One of the more difficult and pressing challenges confronting curriculum inquiry today relates to the increasing enclosure and privatization of the public sphere. Public schools, often exalted and thought to be among the most resilient spaces of the common, are now incredibly fragile, on the brink of being fully besieged by the onslaught of neoliberalism ([De Lissovoy, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b12); [Saltman, 2007](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b48)). While this practice of enclosure is not necessarily new, as market forces have long been encroaching the spaces of public schooling ([Du Bois, 1918](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b17); [Dewey, 1930](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b16)), the emergence of neoliberalism in the last thirty years marks a particularly insidious turn. The novelty of neoliberalism resides not only in that it has become normalized and even celebrated, but also in that the far-reaching tentacles of neoliberalism assume pedagogical dimensions.[1](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en1) At the same time, the unapologetic posturing of neoliberalism ([Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) offers curriculum theorists the contours of a common target that has not always been so easily recognizable in attempts to chart the flows and logics of capital. From this, we might gather that the current configuration of neoliberalism, like that of public schooling, precariously occupies a liminal status between that of inordinate durability and immanent vulnerability.

Given the hubris and arrogance of neoliberalism, we are now better armored with the vocabularies and conceptual understandings needed to both defend and rethink the institution of public schooling in our current juncture. For curriculum inquiry, this means reclaiming, and more accurately, reinventing, the educational experience. As [William Pinar (2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)) notes:

In its interest in and commitment to the study of educational experience, curriculum theory is critical of contemporary school “reform.” Indeed, “educational experience” seems precisely what politicians do not want, as they insist we focus on test scores, the “bottom line.” By linking the curriculum to student performance on standardized examinations, politicians have, in effect, taken control of what is to be taught: the curriculum. Examination-driven curricula demote teachers from scholars and intellectuals to technicians in service to the state. The cultivation of self-reflexive, interdisciplinary erudition and intellectuality disappears. Rationalized as “accountability,” political socialization replaces education. (pp. 2–3)

Although Pinar is highlighting some of the most saliently corrosive school practices, his stress on the enclosure of the educational experience does not translate into acquiescence to market forces. In fact, it could be argued that the circumstances for absolute democracy have never been more possible ([Hardt & Negri, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b33)).[2](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en2) In the face of perpetual reform, high-stakes testing, mechanical pedagogy, scripted curricula, and punitive disciplinary practices, curriculum inquiry is immediately thrust into a limit-situation in which a new horizon of possibilities is unveiled ([Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22)). In other words, these realities are not “the impassable boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin” (Alvaro Vieira Pinto, quoted in [Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22), p. 99). With this, the task of curriculum inquiry is to collectively imagine fields of possibility ([Appadurai, 1996](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b3)), working from the occupied, yet generative, confines of a “cramped space” ([Deleuze & Guattari, 1986](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b13), p. 17). At the same time, such calls for an unleashed curricular imagination must be tempered with the humility of a diligent yet playful social imagination that recognizes that problems are always beginning anew and altering in both form and appearance ([de Certeau, 1984](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b11)). Thus in curriculum inquiry's quest to reinvent public schooling as a beacon of possibility and promise for a new democratic future, the only way to proceed is to nourish a radically collective imagination and embrace the inextinguishable spirit of struggle ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15); [Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b29); [Pinar, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)).

SKETCHING A FRAMEWORK OF BIOPOLITICS

With the task of unfurling the curricular imagination I shall explore the recent writings of two educational theorists, Henry Giroux and Tyson Lewis, in hope of uncovering the potential insights they may provide for the field of curriculum inquiry. Of primary importance for an engagement with these writings is a theoretical framework of biopower and biopolitics which Giroux and Lewis both employ. In The History of Sexuality, and in his lectures at the College of France in spring 1976, [Michel Foucault (1990, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b20)) characterized a new regime of power. To describe a more complex account of contemporary power configurations that in many ways exceed and even bridge the regimes of sovereignty and disciplinary force, Foucault outlined the concept of biopower. Traditionally the power of the sovereign has been thought to be implicated within a juridical and contractual model of dominance that is marked by the capacity to take life, while disciplinary power has been characterized by the effective organization and discipline of the soul ([Foucault, 1977](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b19)). Whereas previous disciplinary powers aimed for the control of individuals at the level of the body, this new nondisciplinary form of power—biopower—aims to control the biological developments of life not through discipline but through processes of regularization and sites of equilibrium. In other words, whereas disciplinary power acts on individual bodies through training, surveillance and forms of punishment, biopower acts on “man-as-species,” achieving control over living beings, relations, and domains of the (re)production of life ([Foucault, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21), p. 243). Biopower, then, intervenes in all social, cultural, economic, and environmental aspects of life.

Despite its orientation as a technology of rule or Power (as in potere and pouvoir)[3](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en3) and its continuing reliance on sovereign force, biopower attempts to conceal these modalities as it purports to be primarily concerned with the (re)production and protection of life forms. In [Foucault's (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21)) account, biopower appears as a technology of security—not at the level of the individual, but of species—that endeavors to establish an equilibrium or homeostasis. As an apparatus of security, biopower shields those it protects—the “well born” or “Eugenia,” according to [Antonio Negri (2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b44))—from internal and external threats, or inferior species that may contaminate, so to speak, the dominant species (p. 193). Accordingly, biopower is invested in the overall health and security of the population and achieves its aim of homeostasis through techniques of regularization and invariably mechanisms of exclusion and containment. In this vein, biopower engages in subtle forms of eugenics and social engineering in the name of biological security.

To put it boldly, biopower attempts to mediate, control, capture, and administer all aspects of life. It is a power that becomes embedded, dispersed, and regularized throughout society and its populations. Biopolitics, then, is essentially the political struggle over life and death, and as we will see in the writings of Giroux and Lewis, the struggle to produce certain forms of life. While [Giorgio Agamben (1998](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b1)) along with [Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b32)) are the most prominent writers exploring biopolitics in the wake of Foucault, their respective readings are very different. Whereas Agamben posits a negative biopolitics that takes on the form of a thanatopolitics predisposed toward certain forms of death, Hardt and Negri embrace an affirmative view of biopolitics that is oriented toward the production of social and political forms of life ([Esposito, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b18)). Picking up on these intonations, the writings of [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)), and similarly those of [Lewis (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b37)), point curriculum theorists to two very important questions. [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) asks whether public schooling is facilitating democracy and accompanying forms of life or surrendering to a biopolitics of neoliberalism that renders disposable those populations marginalized by race and class. As for [Lewis (2009b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b40)), readers are pushed to consider whether we can imagine and embrace a new theory of affirmative biopolitics and education conducive to collective political life, or succumb to necroschooling, “a form of education that is more concerned with abandonment than with social investment, protection, etc.” (p. 33). The framing of these questions are not only biopolitical in nature, but they strike at the very heart of curriculum inquiry and the task of reinventing the educational experience ([Pinar, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)).

In my engagement with Giroux and Lewis, I shall suggest that biopolitics warrants the attention of curriculum inquiry in at least two significant ways: it not only offers a viable template for understanding the convergence of neoliberalism with the logics of White supremacy ([Bonilla-Silva, 2001](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b7)) and a war on the poor, but it also calls into question the very institution of schooling and thus the efficacy and integrity of reform. The former is an essential diagnostic tool for registering the relationships between schooling and the broader sites of culture, politics, and economics ([Apple, 1979](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b4); [Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22)), while the latter represents the praxis and unfolding of a “generative theme” that will open possibilities to “surmount the limit-situations” confronting curriculum inquiry ([Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22), p. 103). Hence a focus on biopolitics pushes the curricular imagination in productive ways, offering a new orientation to expand and imagine curriculum in a new key ([Pinar & Irwin, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b46)).

In what follows I shall first focus on [Giroux's (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) Youth in a Suspect Society: Democracy or Disposability? before engaging some of the writings of Lewis. By way of conclusion, I will offer an analysis that attempts to bridge their projects and further draw out the implications for curriculum inquiry.

DEMOCRACY OR DISPOSABILITY?

In addition to providing significant contributions to the field of curriculum theory, the writings of [Henry Giroux (1981a](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b25); [Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b28); [Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b29); [Giroux & Purpel, 1983](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b30)) have always posed grave challenges to the ways in which we conceptualize the curricular relations between power and knowledge, social contexts, and school practices. As such, a serious examination of [Giroux's (1981b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b26)) work leads us to approach curriculum with the recognition that it is inextricably bound to broader social contexts of cultural and political struggle. For Giroux, such contexts are never reduced, abstracted, or divorced from an ever-complex array of school practices that materially impact students on a daily basis. Always charting the domains of public pedagogy, Giroux's writings offer curriculum theorists extraordinary insights into how contestations of power shape and organize not only official school curricula or hidden curricula, but all aspects of social life ([Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b28)). And now, perhaps more than ever, the writings of Giroux summon the curricular imagination to respond to a unique constellation of challenges that threaten to foreclose the educational experience along with the remaining possibilities for a democratic future.

Youth in a Suspect Society marks a continuation of Giroux's recent interests in the resurgence of authoritarianism, market-based logics of disposability, and a biopolitics of neoliberalism. The convergence of these concepts, for Giroux, is accompanied by a fundamental shift from an imperfect social state to a ruthless market state. This shift, from “state sovereignty” to “market sovereignty” is characterized by a disinvestment in the public sphere. In this configuration, anything pertaining to the public is not only neglected but also met with great disdain. As an economic logic, neoliberalism invades the public sphere, invalidating and enclosing that which cannot be filtered through a market rationality. Here, neoliberalism meets biopolitics in that politics distances itself from social governance—withdrawing from a commitment to protect its citizens—and increasingly resorts to governing populations through the economic reign of the market. In this cruel landscape that Giroux calls the biopolitics of neoliberalism, the social state ceases to exist only to be replaced by a corporate state that is intent on warding off democratic sensibilities and enclosing the few spheres of the public that remain.

Giroux's conceptual mapping of a biopolitics of neoliberalism contains yet another important element. Excluded from social and political life, those populations marginalized by class and race are reduced from the status of citizens to waste, or in [Agamben's (1998](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b1)) terms, from bios (social and political life) to zoē (life without quality). Rendered disposable under a biopolitics of neoliberalism, marginalized populations are vulnerable to Agamben's formulation of biopolitics as thanatopolitics. Giroux, rightfully taking Agamben's biopolitics seriously in this instance, draws here from [Achille Mbembe (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b42)), who argues that “vast populations are subject to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40). In short, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability ushers in forms of social death, rendering populations expendable, without support, protection, or compassion. In Giroux's account, such a biopolitical order abandons populations under the guise that they represent the refuse of a neoliberal economic regime. This epitomizes, for Giroux, a complete violation of ethical responsibility and obligation to youth and the democratic future to come.

With the breaking of the social contract, in the U.S. context, the state is transformed from a “weakened welfare state into an increasingly powerful racialized warfare state” ([Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27), p. 71). Embedded within this shift, what emerges is a powerful concoction of a racial state, a punishing state, and a carceral state, in which disposable populations constitute a threat that must be contained. Hence, prisons become the primary disciplinary apparatuses that regulate and govern disposable populations. According to [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)), “The institution of the prison is at the ideological center of the biopolitics of the punishing state dutifully inscribing its presence into the political and cultural landscape of everyday life” (p. 83). In this important passage, we can begin to see how the site of schooling comes to function as an appendage for the carceral state. In fact, as [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) asserts, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability is able to forcefully “collapse the distinctions between crime and social problems, prison and school, and race and disposability, while constructing spaces that subject minority youth and others rendered redundant to a form of punitive control, if not social death” (p. 80). As a result of this blurring of boundaries, apartheid schools—those schools “in which 99 to 100 percent of students are nonwhite” ([Kozol, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b36), p. 18)—come to closely resemble prisons, or at the very least, enclaves of intellectual, social and political containment ([De Lissovoy, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b12); [Devine 1996](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b14); [Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)). Too often, such sites jettison the educational lives and futures of those students within their purview.

It is here where the real insight of Giroux's text takes shape and productively aggravates the curricular imagination by exposing the broken promises of public schooling. While many have similarly pointed to the eroding investment in the futures of working-class youth of color ([Kozol, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b36); [Valenzuela, 1999](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b51)), Giroux is able to outline the contours of a viable theory—a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability—that provides a new analytic for understanding the form and content of teacher education in relation to broader social patterns. There are at least two points of interest here worth noting. First, [Foucault (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21)) insisted that modern racism is a “mechanism that allows biopower to work. So racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power” (p. 258). Despite this, few theorists focusing on biopolitics endeavor to interrogate how “racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower” ([Foucault, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21), p. 258). Youth in a Suspect Society not only attempts to make explicit the links between biopower and schooling, but it achieves in beginning to demonstrate how the warehousing of Black and Brown children in lockdown schools—along with the production of educational and social death—performs a principle function of biopower. The importance of making these conceptual links between biopower and racial domination, and subsequently Giroux's connection of this theory to material outcomes cannot be understated.

Second, employing the theory of a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability, Giroux highlights the broken promises of public schooling in terms that refocus what is at stake for curriculum inquiry. Beyond the myopic rhetoric of accountability and standards, it is absolute democracy ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15); [Hardt & Negri, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b33)) and its unfolding futurity that is in jeopardy. Put differently, a biopolitical reading of curriculum insists that the production and reproduction of certain forms of life are at the very center of the educational experience. Thus, no longer can prevailing conceptions of curriculum fail to locate the ideological underpinnings of school practices, allowing the relationship between schooling and economic, political, and cultural imperatives to remain veiled. In other words, curriculum inquiry must strive to locate and disrupt the commensurability between these prevailing imperatives, their broader political projects and the mandates they impose on curriculum. With the aid of Giroux's biopolitical framework, the curricular imagination must conceive of the educational experience not as a formula to be consumed or constructed for calculable instrumentality, but rather as a vital resource for galvanizing a robust social imagination capable of collectively negotiating and perpetually reconstructing democratic life ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15)). The writings of Tyson Lewis, which I will now turn to, are especially crucial for this task.

CONFRONTING NECROSCHOOLING: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF BIOPOLITICAL SCHOOLING

In what might initially strike some as a dizzying array of scholarship—ranging from aesthetics to utopian theories of education—the vast intellectual production of Tyson Lewis, I argue, is indispensable for any project of rethinking the educational experience. Lewis is, in my mind, the central figure writing about biopolitics and schooling today. His gallant efforts to piece together the biopolitical writings of Foucault, Agamben, and Hardt and Negri have led him to rethink the strengths and inadequacies of educational thinkers such as John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Ivan Illich. More importantly, Lewis’s writings exemplify a commitment to reimagining the space of the school in a biopolitical context. For example, whereas Giroux’s (2009) text serves predominately as a diagnostic tool for curriculum inquiry, the writings of Lewis (2007) propel the curricular imagination by not only confronting the logics of modern schooling, but by imaginatively mapping an alternative theory of biopolitical education. I will confine my analysis to three of Lewis’s recent essays, all of which explore biopolitics and schooling, and as I shall suggest, bear a particular importance for curriculum inquiry.

The first essay, “Defining the Political Ontology of the Classroom: Toward a Multitudinous Education” (Lewis, 2008), critiques Hardt and Negri’s (2004) theorizing of the multitude—an internally different and insurgent global force that opposes the sovereignty of the new global form of rule, Empire. Lewis rightfully points out that Hardt and Negri not only utterly lack theory of education, but they completely fail to acknowledge youth as agents of the multitude. The major shortcomings of this model offer, for Lewis, an opening to imagine a theory of education that retains the spirit of the multitude and its oppositional dimensions. Highlighting¶ the various aims of modern schooling in its corrupt capacity as a people-building project, Lewis (2008) endeavors to reconceptualize schools as spaces of biopolitical production in which subjectivities oriented toward “democracy in its ontological form” are cultivated (pp. 255–256). Rather than administering populations, such schools would be sites of democratic engagement and struggle.

Such a view of schooling is, for the most part, quite compatible with Pinar’s (2004) take on the educational experience. Both of their formulations are articulated against the backdrop of neoliberalism’s enclosure of the form and contleggent of schooling. To this, Lewis (2008) calls for a mode of schooling for the multitude that “ceases to be predetermined by standards (no¶ matter how flexible) and becomes a flexible, open-ended tool responsive to the needs and¶ immediate interests of the multitude to increase the general intellect and the power to act” (p. 256). This way of thinking about biopolitics and curriculum as a temporal and spatial act of unfolding shifts the focus of schools in such a way that the “experiences of children are not to be alienated from the curriculum but rather integrated into the classroom through shared, biopolitical group work that involves the reconstitution of the common” (p. 257). While the project of reinventing common spaces in schools is essential, such a task also encounters major obstacles in a neoliberal context. The problem arises in that the economic and political imperatives of neoliberalism reduce spaces of cooperation and collectivity to the “colonial category of wastelands,” given that such spaces do not promote capitalism (Shiva, 2005, p. 25). In this sense, such spaces are simultaneously rendered discardable and threatening. There is a wild, overflowing, and inexhaustible power in the common (Hardt & Negri, 2009), and capital’s preoccupation with enclosing “wastelands” is a testament to this power. Clearly, curriculum inquiry must struggle with the biopolitical task of reinventing and nurturing the common, which in turn produces democratic subjectivities. Pg. 5-11

#### Vote neg for a historical materialist world-systems approach.

Chase-Dunn 99 (Chris, Christopher Chase-Dunn is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California-Riverside. He received his Ph.D in Sociology from Stanford University in 1975. Chase-Dunn has done crossnational quantitative studies of the effects of dependence on foreign investment and he studies cities and settlement systems in order to explain human sociocultural evolution. His research focuses on interpolity systems, including both the modern global political economy and earlier regional world-systems. One project examines the causes of the expansion and collapse of cities and empires in several regional world-systems as well as the contemporary process of global state formation. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation. Chase-Dunn is the founder and former editor of the Journal of World-Systems Research. and the Series Editor of a book series published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. In 2001 he was elected a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In 2002 he was elected President of the Research Committee on Economy and Society (RC02) of the International Sociological Association. And in 2008 he was elected Distinguished Senior Scholar of the International Political Economy (IPE) section of the International Studies Association. “Globalization: A World-Systems Perspective.” Journal of World-Systems Research, v2, summer, p 188-206//shree)

Today the terms “world economy”, “world market”, and “globalization” are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the “wealth of nations” reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national “development” could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered “world-system” (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1978).1 Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system. Now, 20 years on, social scientists working in the area are trying to understand the history and evolution of the whole system, as well as how local, national and regional entities have been integrated into it. This current research has required broadening our perspective to include deeper temporal and larger spatial frameworks. For example, some recent research has compared the modern Europe-centered world-system of the last six hundred years with earlier, smaller intersocietal networks that have existed for millennia (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Other work uses the knowledge of cycles and trends that has grown out of world-systems research to anticipate likely future events with a precision impossible before the advent of the theory. This is still a new field and much remains to be done, but enough has already been achieved to provide a valuable understanding of the phenomenon of globalization. The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups. The first task is to put this development into historical context. The world-systems perspective has shown that intersocietal geopolitics and geoeconomics has been the relevant arena of competition for national-states, firms and classes for hundreds of years. The degree of international connectedness of economic and political/military networks was already important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first “transnational corpora-tions” (TNCs) were the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. They organized both production and exchange on an intercontinental scale. The rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, which continues today with the relative decline of the United States hegemony, was already in full operation in the seventeenth century rise and fall of Dutch hegemony (see Arrighi 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Taylor 1996). The capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical processes and secular trends for hundreds of years (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 2). The cyclical processes include the rise and fall of hegemons, the Kondratieff wave (a forty to sixty year business cycle)2 , a cycle of warfare among core states (Goldstein 1988), and cycles of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The world-system has also experienced several secular trends including a long-term proletarianization of the world work force, growing concentration of capital into larger and larger firms, increasing internationalization of capital investment and of trade, and accelerating internationalization of political structures. In this perspective, globalization is a long-term upward trend of political and economic change that is affected by cyclical processes. The most recent technological changes, and the expansions of international trade and investment, are part of these long-run changes. One question is exactly how the most recent changes compare with the long-run trends? And what are the important continuities as well as the qualitative differences that accompany these changes? These are the questions that I propose to explore. types of globalization There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished. There are also several misunderstandings and misinterpretations that need to be clarified. Let us evaluate five different meanings of globalization: (1) Common ecological constraints This aspect of globalization involves global threats due to our fragile ecosystem and the globalization of ecological risks. Anthropogenic causes of ecological degradation have long operated, and these in turn have affected human social evolution (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). But ecological degradation has only recently begun to operate on a global scale. This fact creates a set of systemic constraints that require global collective action. (2) Cultural globalization This aspect of globalization relates to the diffusion of two sets of cultural phenomena: • the proliferation of individualized values, originally of Western origin, to ever larger parts of the world population. These values are expressed in social constitutions that recognize individual rights and identities and transnational and international efforts to protect “human rights.” • the adoption of originally Western institutional practices. Bureaucratic organization and rationality, belief in a law-like natural universe, the values of economic efficiency and political democracy have been spreading throughout the world since they were propagated in the European Enlightenment (Meyer 1996; Markoff 1996). Whereas some of the discussions of the world polity assume that cultural components have been a central aspect of the modern world-system from the start (e.g. Meyer 1989; Mann 1986), I emphasize the comparatively non-normative nature of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1998: Chapter 5). But I acknowledge the growing salience of cultural consensus in the last 100 years. Whereas the modern world-system has always been, and is still, multicultural, the growing influence and acceptance of Western values of rationality, individualism, equality, and efficiency is an important trend of the twentieth century. (3) Globalization of communication Another meaning of globalization is connected with the new era of information technology. Anthony Giddens(1996) insists that social space comes to acquire new qualities with generalized electronic communications, albeit only in the networked parts of the world. In terms of accessibility, cost and velocity, the hitherto more local political and geographic parameters that structured social relationships are greatly expanded. One may well argue that time-space compression (Harvey 1989) by new information technologies is simply an extension and acceleration of the very long-term trend toward technological development over the last ten millenia (Chase-Dunn 1994). Yet, the rapid decrease in the cost of communications may have qualitatively altered the relationship between states and consciousness and this may be an important basis for the formation of a much stronger global civil society. Global communication facilities have the power to move things visible and invisible from one part of the globe to another whether any nation-state likes it or not. This applies not only to economic exchange, but also to ideas, and these new networks of communication can create new political groups and alignments. How, and to what extent, will this undermine the power of states to structure social relationships? (4) Economic globalization Economic globalization means globe-spanning economic relationships. The interrelationships of markets, finance, goods and services, and the networks created by transnational corporations are the most important manifestations of this. Though the capitalist world-system has been international in essence for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in recent decades. Economic globalization has been accelerated by what information technology has done to the movement of money. It is commonly claimed that the market’s ability to shift money from one part of the globe to another by the push of a button has changed the rules of policy-making, putting economic decisions much more at the mercy of market forces than before. The world-system has undergone major waves of economic globalization before, especially in the last decades of the the nineteenth century. One important question is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave. All the breathy discussions of global capitalism and global society assume that this is the case, but careful comparative research indicates that this is not so (see below and Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). (5) Political globalization Political globalization consists of the institutionalization of international political structures. The Europe-centered world-system has been primarily constituted as an interstate system—a system of conflicting and allying states and empires. Earlier world-systems, in which accumulation was mainly accomplished by means of institutionalized coercive power, experienced an oscillation between multicentric interstate systems and core-wide world empires in which a single “universal” state conquered all or most of the core states in a region. The Europe-centered system has also experienced a cyclical alternation between political centralization and decentralization, but this has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states that do not conquer the other core states. Hence the modern world-system has remained multicentric in the core, and this is due mainly to the shift toward a form of accumulation based more on the production and profitable sale of commodities—capitalism. The hegemons have been the most thoroughly capitalist states and they have preferred to follow a strategy of controlling trade and access to raw material imports from the periphery rather than conquering other core states to extract tribute or taxes. Power competition in an interstate system does not require much in the way of cross-state cultural consensus to operate systemically. But since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed “global governance” by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. It refers to the growth of both specialized and general international organizations. The general organizations that have emerged are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations. The sequence of these “proto-world-states” constitutes a process of institution-building, but unlike earlier “universal states” this one is slowly emerging by means of condominium among core states rather than conquest. This is the trend of political globalization. It is yet a weak, but persistent, concentration of sovereignty in international institutions. If it continues it will eventuate in a single global state that could effectively outlaw warfare and enforce its illegality. The important empirical question, analogous to the discussion of economic globalization above, is the relative balance of power between international and global political organizations vis a vis national states. We assume this to be an upward trend, but like economic globalization it probably is also a cycle. Measuring Economic Globalization The brief discussion above of economic globalization implies that it is a long-run upward trend. The idea is that international economic competition as well as geopolitical competition were already important in the fourteenth century and that they became increasingly important as more and more international trade and international investment occurred. In its simplest form this would posit a linear upward trend of economic globalization. An extreme alternative hypothesis about economic globalization would posit a completely unintegrated world composed of autarchic national economies until some point (perhaps in the last few decades) at which a completely global market for commodities and capital suddenly emerged. Let us examine data that can tell us more about the temporal emergence of economic globalization. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time. Trade globalization can be operationalized as the proportion of all world production that crosses international boundaries. Investment globalization would be the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. “foreigners”). And we could also investigate the degree of economic integration of countries by determining the extent to which national economic growth rates are correlated across countries. 3 It would be ideal to have these measures over several centuries, but comparable fi gures are not available before the nineteenth century, and indeed even these are sparse and probably unrepresentative of the whole system until well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless we can learn some important things by examining those comparable data that are available. Figure 1 shows trade and investment globalization. Trade globalization is the ratio of estimated total world exports (the sum of the value of exports of all countries) divided by an estimate of total world product (the sum of all the national GDPs). Investment globalization is the total book value of all foreign direct investment divided by the total world product. The trade globalization figures show the hypothesized upward trend as well as a downturn that occurred between 1929 and 1950. Note that the time scale in Figure 1 is distorted by the paucity of data before 1950. It is possible that important changes in trade globalization are not visible in this series because of the wide temporal gaps in the data. Indeed a more recent study has shown that this is the case. There was a shorter and less well-defined wave of trade globalization from 1900 to 1929 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). Figure 1 also shows that the trade indicator differs in some ways from the investment indicator. Investment globalization was higher (or as high) in 1913 as it was in 1991, while trade globalization was considerably lower in 1913 than it was in 1992. We have fewer time points for the investment data, so we cannot tell for sure about the shape of the changes that took place, but these two series imply that different indicators of economic globalization may show somewhat different trajectories. More research needs to be done on investment globalization to determine its exact trajectory and for comparison with trade globalization and other world-system cycles and trends. A third indicator of economic globalization is the correlation of national GDP growth rates (Grimes 1993). This shows the extent to which periods of national economic growth and stagnation have been synchronized across countries. In a fully integrated global economy it would be expected that growth and stagnation periods would be synchronized across countries and so there would be a high correlation of national growth rates. Grimes shows that, contrary to the hypothesis of a secular upward trend toward increasing global integration, the correlation among national growth rates fluctuates cyclically over the past two centuries. In a data series from 1860 to 1988 Grimes found two periods in which national economic growth decline sequences are highly correlated across countries: - 1913-1927; and after 1970. Before and in between these peaks are periods of very low synchronization. Further research needs to be done to determine the temporal patterns of different sorts of economic globalization. At this point we can say that the step-function version of a sudden recent leap to globalization can be rejected. The evidence we have indicates that there are both long-term secular trends and huge cyclical oscillations. Trade globalization shows a long-term trend with a big dip during the depression of the 1930s. The investment globalization indicates a cycle with at least two peaks, one before World War I and one after 1980. Grimes’s indicator of synchronous economic growth indicates a cyclical fluctuation with one peak in the 1920s and another since 1970. These results, especially those that imply cycles, indicate that change occurs relatively quickly and that the most recent period of globalization shares important features with earlier periods of intense international economic interaction. The question of the similarities and differences between the most recent wave and earlier waves of globalization is clearly an important one. systemic cycles of accumulation Giovanni Arrighi (1994) shows how hegemony in the modern world system has evolved in a series of “systemic cycles of accumulation” (SCAs) in which finance capital has employed different forms of organization and different relationships with organized state power. These qualitative organizational changes have accompanied the secular increase in the power of money and markets as regulatory forces in the modern world-system. The SCAs have been occurring in the Europe-centered world-system since at least the fourteenth century. Arrighi’s model shows both the similarities and the differences in the relationships that obtain between financial capital and states within the different systemic cycles of accumulation. The British SCA and the American SCA had both similarities and important differences. The main differences that Arrighi emphasizes are the “internalization of transaction costs” (represented by the vertical integration of TNCs) and the extent to which the U.S. tried to create “organized capitalism” on a global scale. The British SCA had fewer global firms and pushed hard for international free trade. The U.S. SCA is characterized by a much heavier focus on global firms and by a more structured approach to “global governance” possibly intended to produce economic growth in other core regions, especially those that are geopolitically strategic. Arrighi argues that President Roosevelt used the power of the hegemonic state to try to create a balanced world of capitalist growth. This sometimes meant going against the preferences of finance capital and U.S. corporations. For example, the Japanese miracle was made possible because the U.S. government prevented U.S. corporations from turning Japan (and Korea) into just one more dependent and peripheralized country. This policy of enlightened global Keynesianism was continued in a somewhat constrained form under later presidents, albeit in the guise of domestic “military Keynesianism” justified by the Soviet threat. In this interpretation the big companies and the finance capitalists returned to power with the decline in competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The rise of the Eurodollar market forced Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods financial structure, and this was followed by ReaganismThatcherism, IMF structural adjustment, streamlining, deregulation and the delegitimation of anything that constrained the desires of global capital investment. The idea that we are all subject to the forces of a global market-place, and that any constraint on the freedom to invest will result in a deficit of “competitiveness,” is a powerful justification for destroying the institutions of the “Second Wave” (e.g. labor unions, welfare, agricultural subsidies, etc.).4 Under conditions of increased economic globalization the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This results increasing inequalities within countries, and increasing levels of dis-satisfaction compared to the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian regimes. It is also produces political reactions, especially national-populist movements.5 Indeed, Philip McMichael (1996) attributes the anti-government movements now occurring in the U.S. West, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to the frustrations caused by the deregulation of U.S. agriculture. It would also be useful to investigate the temporal patterns of the other types of globalization: cultural,6 political, technological and ecological. Of interest too are the relationships between these and economic globalization. Much empirical work needs to be done to operationalize these concepts and to assemble the relevant information. Here, for now, I will hypothesize that all these types exhibit both long-run secular and cyclical features. I will also surmise that cultural and political globalization are lagged behind the secular upward trend of economic globalization. the politics of globalization This last hypothesis bears on the question of adjustments of political and social institutions to increases in economic and technological globalization. I would submit that the current period of economic globalization has occurred in part due to technological changes that are linked to Kondratieff waves, and in part because of the profit squeezes and declining hegemony of the U.S. economy in the larger world market. 7 The financial aspects of the current period of economic globalization began when President Nixon canceled the Bretton Woods agreement in response to pressures on the value of the U.S. dollar coming from the rapidly growing Eurodollar market (Harvey 1995). This occurred in 1967, and this date is used by many to mark the beginning of a K-wave downturn. The saturation of the world market demand for the products of the post-World War II upswing, the constraints on capital accumulation posed by business unionism and the political entitlements of the welfare states in core countries caused a profit squeeze that motivated large firms and investors and their political helpers to try to break out of these constraints. The possibilities for global investment opened up by new communications and information technology created new maneuverability for capital. The demise of the Soviet Union8 added legitimacy to the revitalized ideology of the free market and this ideology swept the Earth. Not only Reagan and Thatcher, but Eurocommunists and labor governments in both the core and the periphery, adopted the ideology of the “lean state,” deregulation, privatization and the notion that everything must be evaluated in terms of global efficiency and competitiveness. Cultural globalization has been a very long-term upward trend since the emergence of the world religions in which any person, regardless of ethnicity or kinship, could become a member of the moral community by confessing faith in the “universal” god. But moral and political cosmography has usually encompassed a smaller realm than the real dimensions of the objective trade and political/military networks in which people have been involved. What has occurred at the end of the twentieth century is a near convergence between subjective cosmography and objective networks. The main cause of this is probably the practical limitation of human habitation to the planet Earth. But the long-run declining costs of transportation and communications are also an important element. Whatever the causes, the emergent reality is one in which consciousness embraces (or goes beyond) the real systemic networks of interaction. This geographical feature of the global system is one of its uniquenesses, and it makes possible for the future a level of normative order that has not existed since human societies were very small and egalitarian (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997a). The ideology of globalization has undercut the support and the rationale behind all sorts of so-called Second Wave institutions—labor unions, socialist parties, welfare programs, and communist states. While these institutions have not been destroyed everywhere, the politicians of the right (e.g. Newt Gingrich in the U.S.) have explicitly argued for their elimination. At the same time, the very technologies that made capitalist economic globalization possible also have the potential to allow those who do not benefit from the free reign of capital to organize new forms of resistance, or to revitalize old forms. It is now widely agreed by many, even in the financial community, that the honeymoon of neo-liberalism will eventually end and that the rough edges of global capitalism will need to be buffed. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1996, tried to capitalize on popular resentment of corporate downsizing. The Wall Street Journal has reported that stock analysts worry about the “lean and mean” philosophy becoming a fad that has the potential to delegitimate the business system and to create political backlashes. This was expressed in the context of a discussion of the announcement of huge bonuses for AT&T executives following another round of downsizing. I already mentioned the difficulties that states are having in controlling communications on the Internet. I do not believe the warnings of those who predict a massive disruption of civilization by hordes of sociopaths waging “cyberwar”9 But I do think that the new communications technologies provide new opportunities for the less powerful to organize themselves to respond should global capitalism run them over or leave them out. The important question is what are the most useful organizational forms for resistance? What we already see are all sorts of nutty localisms, nationalisms and a proliferation of identity politics. The militias of the U.S. West are ordering large amounts of fertilizer with which to resist the coming of the “Blue Helmets”—a fantasized world state that is going to take away their handguns and assualt rifles.10 Localisms and specialized identities are the postmodern political forms that are supposedly produced by information technology, flexible specialization, and global capitalism (Harvey 1989). I think that at least some of this trend is a result of desperation and the demise of plausible alternatives in the face of the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and the much-touted triumph of efficiency over justice. Be that as it may, a historical perspective on the latest phase of globalization allows us to see the long-run patterns of interaction between capitalist expansion and the movements of opposition that have tried to protect people from the negative aspects of market forces and exploitation. And this perspective has implications for going beyond the impasse of the present to build a more cooperative and humane global system (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1999). the spiral of capitalism and socialism The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as “the spiral of capitalism and socialism.” The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The history and developmental trajectory of the communist states can be explained as socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism. The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements can be seen in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another’s growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology. Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The sequence of industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and taken control of labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary “informal sector” in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back. The mixed success of workers’ organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been supplanted by “flexible accumulation” (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers), are all production strategies that make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable. communist states in the world-system Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and use this power to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done and were doing similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon which the capitalist world-economy has seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were indeed structurally autonomous from world capitalism. The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization of Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of “two superpowers”—one capitalist and one communist—in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the “capitalist” bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest revolutionary “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called “flexible accumulation.” The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger. The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s. The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the “historically planned economies” in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a). Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The big socio-political changes were a matter of the superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization. As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as are the current moves toward austerity and privatization in many semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism. The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed “globalization of the economy,” has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, a political reaction against economic globalization is now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military) and a coalition of oppositional forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, populists of the right, etc.). Political Implications of the World-System Perspective The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. Note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism. The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the enlightenment has never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible.

## Case

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#### Refusal to strategically use institutions lets neocons take over --- theory is useless without being tethered to concrete politics.

Joseph SCHWARTZ 15. Professor of Political Theory, Temple University. “Being Postmodern While Late Modernity Burned: On the Apolitical Nature of Contemporary Self-Defined ‘Radical’ Political Theory” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, G. Smulewicz-Zucker & M. J. Thompson, eds. 181-5.

Can there be a political, if not philosophical, reconciliation among radical (social) democrats, democratic advocates of a "politics of difference," and self-proclaimed radical democratic post-structuralists? If those who favor a pluralist "politics for difference" believe in the equality of all citizens to fulfill their life projects, then they must consider how to achieve equality [END PAGE 181] amid difference. And if post-structuralist "radical democrats" take seriously the egalitarian potential of democratic citizenship, then they cannot embrace the "agonal politics" of an unregulated market in which powerful minority elites dominate weaker, but more numerous, marginalized communities. That is, if power is to be redistributed in a democratic fashion, post-structuralist radical democrats cannot eschew strategic consideration of how to achieve majoritarian coalitions that will use state power to reign in corporate power. As Terry Eagleton wrote in After Theory, in the defensive stance of the post-1960s Left, radical theorists lost interest not only in (falsely) universal classes, but also in majoritarian coalition politics. But absent democratic majorities, insurgent or marginalized groups remain just that—marginalized and disempowered.42

As the postindustrial labor market and deunionization yields greater inequalities in income and wealth, radical theorists and activists face a moral imperative to reintroduce into public intellectual life and their teaching the radical democratic principle of equality of standing. This key radical democratic concept holds that regardless of the outcome one achieves in the labor market, all members of society—and their dependents—should have access to those basic human needs that enable individuals to lead a decent material existence and participate in civil life. In addition, equality of standing contends that every member of society must have democratic voice in the institutions that govern their daily lives, be they the school, the community, or the workplace. The British socialist historian and social theorist R. H. Tawney aptly juxtaposed this radical commitment to equality of standing to the liberal conception of market-based equality of opportunity:

Authority, to justify its title, must rest on consent, that power is tolerable only so far as it is accountable to the public and that differences of character and capacity between human beings, however important on their own plane, are of minor significance compared with the capital fact of their common humanity. [Socialism's] object is to extend the application of these principles from the sphere of civil and political rights, where at present, they are nominally recognized to that of economic and social organization, where they are systematically and insolently defined.43

The contemporary educational reform debate illustrates how many liberals erroneously equate marketplace conceptions of equality of opportunity with a democratic conception of equality of standing. Even if we had a more "meritocratic" educational system, student outcomes would [END PAGE 182] still tend to reproduce the educational and social capital of their parents. And should only winners in this meritocratic marketplace race of life lead fulfilling lives? Even if there need be market incentives for individuals to pursue dangerous jobs or professions that demand lengthy training, all members of society who contribute valuable labor—and their dependents—should have the ability to develop to the fullness of their human capabilities.44

Contrary to the fears of "difference theorists" that "universal" concepts such as citizenship suppress diversity, a politics of social solidarity contends that "difference" can only be empowering if the particular communities of a polity share a sufficient sense of common membership so as to sustain a strong complement of social rights. Public provision of basic human needs might, at times, be most effectively provided by decentralized voluntary associations within civil society (e.g., nonprofit day care centers, community-governed health clinics). But to ensure social equality, the state would still play a central role in equitably financing such programs and in setting minimal standards of provision. In their hostility to a bureaucratic, paternalistic welfare state, both post-structuralist feminists and communitarians forget that the power of the democratic state is the only means for rectifying the inegalitarian distribution of a market capitalist economy. Contemporary radical theory’s hostility (or, at best, indifference) to the state perhaps derives from an unwillingness to consider strategies for influencing the state in an era when the center and right largely govern. But to cede state power to procorporate forces is to abandon the project of democratic equality.

It is time for radical democratic and socialist theorists to ask "post-structuralist " and "difference" scholars to make clear their political—rather than solely ontological and metaphysical—commitments. While culturally sustaining identities of “difference” contribute to a pluralist democracy, so too does the solidarity derived from a common sense of citizenship. Citizenship need not be a "homogenizing" category that reduces all to the pursuit of the same needs and interests. If our public understanding of "citizenship" fails to embody a nonmarket conception of human worth then "difference" will not be built on a terrain of democratic equality. "Difference" is not empowering if affluent suburbanites feel no common bonds with residents of the inner city, with the immigrants who care for their children, or with deindustrialized workers experiencing economic and social dislocation. The extreme example of the breakdown of social solidarity in the United States is the absence of any [END PAGE 183] coherent plan to rehabilitate and reintegrate into American society the 2.3 million citizens in jail and prison and another 4 million on parole or probation.

Radical academics only have to interrogate the inegalitarian policies of the neoliberal university to comprehend the continuing relevance of the value of equality of standing to a democratic society. The value of equality of standing often falls by the wayside under the self-interested logic of neoliberal capitalism. Many tenure-track and tenured faculty refuse to express active solidarity with hyper-exploited lecturers, adjuncts, and graduate students who get paid infinitely less for the exact same teaching labor that tenurable labor performs. But unless tenured faculty use their limited leverage to fight for improved working conditions for exploited academic labor, their PhD students will face dismal futures, as tenure-track jobs will soon be as few and far between in America as are unionized industrial jobs.

For several decades now the Right has taken seriously the role of higher education in generating public ideas. The corporate community and their think tanks fund and "discipline" business schools and economic departments to prescribe "free market" ideology. Such market fundamentalism has had disastrous effects on economic policy both before and during the Great Recession. Progressive faculty in the humanities and soft social sciences, in contrast, have done a fairly good job of popularizing among their students concepts of tolerance, diversity, and even transgression. But we have done a poorer job of explaining how rampant social inequality thwarts the lives of millions of our fellow human beings. Despite the Right's claim that Marxists abound in the academy, the concept of class is fairly alien to most college classrooms. Students know why corporate boardrooms should be more diverse; but few question the concept of corporate rule itself.

Radical democratic theorists must subject to democratic critique institutions that are created by interdependent human efforts, but which are governed undemocratically, such as corporations and the neoliberal university. Otherwise, why should not the "different" or "agonal" interests of corporations be treated as persons with full rights to spend unlimited funds on campaigns and lobbying? Democratic theorists also need to revisit arguments as to why labor rights are an essential part of the right to freedom of association, as well as a crucial means for redressing capitalist inequality. We should remind our students that skyrocketing tuition and their resulting indebtedness stem from neoliberal tax giveaways to the rich and corporations. Politicians of both mainstream parties have used the [END PAGE 184] resulting revenue shortfalls to justify drastic cuts in public provision. How many of our students—or colleagues—know that per capital state funding for higher education has declined by 40 percent over the past 30 years?

Not that a simple revisiting of traditional radical democratic values will suffice. Social and political movements still fight largely on the terrain of the nation-state, but to regulate global capital these movements will have to build both transnational solidarity and new forms of democratic transnational regulatory institutions. That is, international social solidarity must go beyond a moral imperative and take on concrete institutional forms. Such new practices must enable working people to raise up, rather than level-down, global labor, environmental, and human rights standards. This task will take both theoretical and political creativity beyond our existing political imaginary.45

The questions addressed in this essay are not purely normative or theoretical. Theorists must reflect a pessimism of the intellect by rigorously analyzing present realities. But theorists must also have the optimism of the will to search for the cracks in the dominant power structure. Their work should remind us of the historical reality that no social order is completely stable or devoid of possibilities for democratic transformation. And it is precisely in times of social crisis that "epochal theory" has contributed to democratic social transformation. Thus, work in democratic political theory should not avoid analysis of contemporary politics, political economy, and policy debates. In short, political theorists who are committed to democratic critique must reengage with politics.

#### Default to pragmatism – we do not need perfect knowledge to act, but mutual understanding of the world allows us to transform social conditions.

Kenneth J. Gergen, 2015. Senior Research Professor in the Department of Psychology at Swarthmore College. “From Mirroring to World-Making: Research as Future Forming.” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 45(3): 287-310. Emory Libraries. Gender Modified.

Whatever exists makes no necessary requirements on representation. One of the most contentious sticking points in the ongoing debates concerns the extent to which our accounts of the world can be driven or determined by events in the world. On the one side is the empiricist tradition, holding that descriptions of the world are “data driven,” and can be corrected and improved through observation. On the other are numerous scholars from across the social sciences holding that without something akin to a theoretical (or linguistic) forestructure, there are no meaningful observations. In effect, theory determines what count as data. Putting side the extremities of these positions (e.g. naïve empiricism vs. linguistic reductionism), there is one way of phrasing the issue about which most social scientists would agree. That is, whatever we take to be the world does not demand or require any particular form of representation (e.g. utterances, markings, movements, signals, or graphics). At its most banal, this is simply to point out that there are many different ways to describe or otherwise represent whatever is before us. With Saussure (1916) it is to point to the culturally situated character of the relationships between signifier and signified. With Quineau (1981) it is to acknowledge the multiple ways one might describe what we might otherwise call “the same situation.” More interestingly it is to propose (with Kant) that it is not only space and time that cannot be derived from experience, but indeed, that experience alone would not demand such common words as “desk” and “chair”. A second conciliatory assumption follows the first.

What stands as objective truth can be established within a research tradition. A significant tension between traditionalists and their critics concerns the presumption that scientific research enables us to make progress toward objective truth. Traditionalists draw support from the manifest achievements of the physical sciences, while critics assail the traditional concepts “progress”, “objectivity”, and “truth”. However, by recognizing the useful outcomes of the physical science research, combined with a relinquishing of the strong claims to foundations, a viable middle ground has been achieved. With the mutual understanding that the relationship between world and word is negotiable, there is broad accord that useful agreements can be reached on the character of what exists. Without philosophic justification, daily life effortlessly proceeds if we agree to index this as “an apple” and that as “an orange”. More formally, Berger and Luckmann (1967) would say that the social order depends importantly on sedimented understandings. With Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of the habitus, it is to recognize the common-sense structures of everyday life – including concepts, practices, and artifacts.

Most importantly, while the naming of the real cannot be justified through the act of reference, it is this very sedimentation of social understandings that permits the communities of science to achieve what we ordinarily view as progress. With Kuhn (1962), it is to say that once there is a shared paradigm (metaphysical, ontological, and practical), the sciences become productive. Only then can we split atoms, place a man [person] on the moon, or eliminate smallpox. By the same token, it is possible for sociologists to make predictions about population shifts, economists to predict the effects of government policy on economic growth, or psychologists to predict the likelihood of criminal recidivism – all subject to falsification. This argument applies as well to the more interpretively based social sciences. While there may be no ultimate truth testing in hermeneutically informed inquiry, there can be relatively high levels of agreement within circumscribed enclaves about the character of subjective life. By the same token, within circumscribed traditions of understanding, it is possible to test hypotheses, or to write objective history, falsifiable ethnography, and accurate accounts of inter-group hostility.

With broad agreement in these two assumptions, the contentious atmosphere of recent decades has begun to subside. As Wertz (2011) has put it, there is an emerging a quite robust spirit of pluralism. We need not lose ourselves in the internecine combat over foundations, nor do we make claims to transcendent or God’s eye truth. Rather, we can accept all forms of research – from laboratory experimentation to single case interpretation – in our work. It is indeed this spirit of pluralism that has fueled the enormous expansion in qualitative research practices. Denzin and Lincoln’s pivotal volume, The handbook of qualitative research was first published in 1994. Yet, by casting aside the authority of foundations, the range of research methods burgeoned, such that by 2011 the work had gone through four new editions. As a result of these developments, few researchers now ask about the capacity of research to yield socially uninflected truth. Rather, reflection moves from issues of philosophic grounding to social utility. Because all research practices can be legitimated in their own terms, the question then becomes one of outcomes. What does the research ultimately contribute to the world more generally? And this question is accompanied by a critical concern with politics and ideology. For whom are the outcomes useful, and in what way; who is benefited, who may be harmed; and who is absent from the discussion? We have, then, a pragmatism with a social conscience.

#### The alt fails—the system’s too sticky to simply wish away

Georg SORENSEN, British International Studies Association, 98 [*IR Theory after the cold war*, p. 87-88] \*\*NCC Packet 2018\*\*

What, then, are the more general problems with the extreme versions of the postpositivist position? The first problem is that they tend to overlook, or downplay, the actual insights produced by non-post-positivists, such as, for example, neorealism. It is entirely true that anarchy is no given, ahistorical, natural condition to which the only possible reaction is adaptation. But the fact that anarchy is a historically specific, socially constructed product of human practice does not make it less real. In a world of sovereign states, anarchy is in fact out there in the real world in some form. In other words, it is not the acceptance of the real existence of social phenomena which produces objectivist reification. Reification is produced by the transformation of historically specific social phenomena into given, ahistorical, natural conditions.21 Despite their shortcomings, neorealism and other positivist theories have produced valuable insights about anarchy, including the factors in play in balance-of-power dynamics and in patterns of cooperation and conflict. Such insights are downplayed and even sometimes dismissed in adopting the notion of 'regimes of truth'. It is, of course, possible to appreciate the shortcomings of neorealism while also recognizing that it has merits. One way of doing so is set forth by Robert Cox. He considers neorealism to be a 'problem-solving theory' which 'takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships . . . as the given framework for action . . . The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination'.22 At the same time, this 'assumption of fixity' is 'also an ideological bias . . . Problem-solving theories (serve) . . . particular national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order'.23 In sum, objectivist theory such as neorealism contains a bias, but that does not mean that it is without merit in analysing particular aspects of international relations from a particular point of view. The second problem with post-positivism is the danger of extreme relativism which it contains. If there are no neutral grounds for deciding about truth claims so that each theory will define what counts as the facts, then the door is, at least in principle, open to anything goes. Steve Smith has confronted this problem in an exchange with Øyvind Østerud. Smith notes that he has never 'met a postmodernist who would accept that "the earth is flat if you say so". Nor has any postmodernist I have read argued or implied that "any narrative is as good as any other"'.24 But the problem remains that if we cannot find a minimum of common standards for deciding about truth claims a post-modernist position appears unable to come up with a metatheoretically substantiated critique of the claim that the earth is flat. In the absence of at least some common standards it appears difficult to reject that any narrative is as good as any other.25 The final problem with extreme post-positivism I wish to address here concerns change. We noted the post-modern critique of neorealism's difficulties with embracing change; their emphasis is on 'continuity and repetition'. But extreme post-positivists have their own problem with change, which follows from their metatheoretical position. In short, how can post-positivist ideas and projects of change be distinguished from pure utopianism and wishful thinking? Post-positivist radical subjectivism leaves no common ground for choosing between different change projects. A brief comparison with a classical Marxist idea of change will demonstrate the point I am trying to make. In Marxism, social change ( e.g. revolution) is, of course, possible. But that possibility is tied in with the historically specific social structures (material and non-material) of the world. Revolution is possible under certain social conditions but not under any conditions. Humans can change the world, but they are enabled and constrained by the social structures in which they live. There is a dialectic between social structure and human behaviour.26 The understanding of 'change' in the Marxist tradition is thus closely related to an appreciation of the historically specific social conditions under which people live; any change project is not possible at any time. Robert Cox makes a similar point in writing about critical theory: 'Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world . . . Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order'.27 That constraint appears to be absent in post-positivist thinking about change, because radical post-positivism is epistemologically and ontologically cut off from evaluating the relative merit of different change projects. Anything goes, or so it seems. That view is hard to distinguish from utopianism and wishful thinking. If neorealism denies change in its overemphasis on continuity and repetition, then radical post-positivism is

#### Past the tipping point and the alt is dictatorship and genocide---only tech can solve.

Eric Levitz 5/17/21. Senior Writer at New York Magazine. MA Johns Hopkins. "We’ll Innovate Our Way Out of the Climate Crisis or Die Trying". Intelligencer. 5-17-2021. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/05/climate-biden-green-tech-innovation.html

Today’s best-case ecological scenario was a horror story just three decades ago. In 1993, Bill Clinton declared that global warming presented such a profound threat to civilization that the U.S. would have to bring its “emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.” Instead, we waited until 2020 to do so; in the interim, humanity burned more carbon than it had since the advent of agriculture. Now, it will take a historically unprecedented, worldwide economic transformation to freeze warming at “only” 2 degrees — a level of temperature rise that will turn “once in a century” storms into annual events, drown entire island nations, and render major cities in the Middle East uninhabitable in summertime (at least for those whose lifestyles involve “walking outdoors without dying of heatstroke”). This is what passes for a utopian vision in 2021. If we confine ourselves to mere optimism — and assume that every Paris Agreement signatory meets its current pledged target for decarbonization — then warming will hit 2.4 degrees by century’s end.

The reality of our ecological predicament invites denial of our political one. Put simply, it is hard to reconcile the scale of the climate crisis with the limits of contemporary American politics. Delusions rush in to fill the gap. Among these is the fantasy of national autonomy; the notion that the United States can save the planet or destroy it, depending on the precise timeline of its domestic decarbonization. A rapid energy transition in the U.S. is a vital cause, not least for its potential to expedite similar transformations abroad. But the battle for a sustainable planet will be won or lost in the developing world. Although American consumption played a central role in the history of the climate crisis, it is peripheral to the planet’s future: Over the coming century, U.S. emissions are expected to account for only 5 percent of the global total.

There is also the delusion of “de-growth’s” viability. The fact that there is no plausible path for global economic expansion that won’t entail climate-induced death and displacement has led some environmentalists to insist on global stagnation. Yet there is neither a mass constituency for this project, nor any reason to believe that there will be any time soon. Freeze the status-quo economy in amber, and you’ll condemn nearly half of humanity to permanent poverty. Divide existing GDP into perfectly even slices, and every person on the planet will live on about $5,500 a year. American voters may express a generalized concern about the climate in surveys, but they don’t seem willing to accept even a modest rise in gas prices — let alone a total collapse in living standards — to address the issue. Meanwhile, any Chinese or Indian leader who attempted to stymy income growth in the name of sustainability would be ousted in short order. It’s conceivable that one could radically reorder advanced economies in a manner that enabled living standards to rise even as GDP fell; Americans might well find themselves happier and more secure in an ultra-low-carbon communal economy in which individual car ownership is heavily restricted, and housing, healthcare, and myriad low-carbon leisure activities are social rights. But nothing short of an absolute dictatorship could affect such a transformation at the necessary speed. And the specter of eco-Bolshevism does not haunt the Global North. Humanity is going to find a way to get rich sustainably, or die trying.

Thus, the chasm between the ecologically necessary and the politically possible can only be bridged by technological advance. And on that front, the U.S. actually has the resources to make a decisive contribution to global decarbonization — and some political will to leverage those resources. Unfortunately, due to some combination of fiscal superstitions and misplaced priorities, the Biden administration’s proposed investments in green innovation remain paltry. An American Jobs Plan with much higher funding for green R&D is both imminently winnable and environmentally imperative. U.S. climate hawks should make securing such legislation a top priority.

The choice before us is techno-optimism or barbarism.

If governments are forced to choose between increasing income growth in the present, and mitigating temperature rise in the future, they are going to pick the former. We’ll get cheap, lab-grown Kobe beef before we get a U.S. Senate willing to tax meat, and steel plants powered by “green hydrogen” before we get anarcho-primitivism with Chinese characteristics.

The question is whether we’ll get such breakthroughs before it’s too late.

Techno-optimism has its hazards, but the progress we’ve made toward decarbonization has come largely through technological innovation. When India canceled plans to construct 14 gigawatts of new coal-fired power stations in 2019, it did not do so in deference to international pressure or domestic environmental movements, but rather to the cost-competitiveness of solar energy. The same story holds across Asia’s developing countries: Thanks to a ninefold reduction in the cost of solar energy over the past decade, the number of new coal plants slated for construction in the region has fallen by 80 percent. Meanwhile, the road to an electric-car revolution was cleared by a collapse in the cost of lithium batteries, the challenge of powering cities with solar energy on cloudy days was eased by a 70 percent drop in the price of utility-scale batteries, and wind power grew 40 percent cheaper. Our species remains lackluster at solidarity and self-government, but we’ve got a real knack for building cool shit.

The technological progress of the past decade was not sufficient to compensate for tepid climate policy. But real techno-utopianism has never been tried: As of 2019, global spending on clean energy R&D totaled $22 billion a year, or 3 percent of the Pentagon’s annual budget. Increasing spending on such research — while expediting cost-reductions in existing technologies by deploying them en masse — should be twin priorities of American climate policy.

The preconditions for green industrialization can be made in America.

The United States has more fiscal capacity and better-financed research universities than any nation on the planet. And, for all the pathologies of our politics, public investment in green tech inspires far weaker opposition than many less-indispensable climate policies. In fact, late last year, with Republicans controlling the Senate and Donald Trump in the White House, the U.S. increased funding for zero-emission technology R&D by $35 billion. America does not have sovereignty over enough humans to save the planet by slashing our domestic emissions. But we just might have the resources and political economy necessary to help the developing world save us all.

Although progress on renewables has exceeded optimistic expectations, the technical obstacles to global decarbonization remain immense. In the most optimistic scenario, scaling up existing, cost-competitive technologies can get us about 16 percent of the emissions reductions necessary for achieving net-zero by 2050, according to the International Energy Agency. Driving down the price of tech we already have will get us another 39 percent. The rest must come from technologies that have yet to be fully developed. We need electrified cement, hydrogen-powered steel plants, and evaporative cooling. We need utility-scale energy storage, electric airplanes, and ultra-high voltage transmission lines. And we’d be remiss to not toss a bit of our collective wealth at game-changing hail marys like nuclear fusion.

#### Only growth incentivizes the necessary innovations to achieve sustainability --- transition fails.

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11.1 Introduction

The sustainability of modern economic growth, as it developed in the todays Western industrialized economies from the beginning of the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, has been questioned at the latest since 1972 when the book The Limits to Growth was published by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972). After more than 200 years of industrial production, large parts of the world population are richer than ever before. However, industrial production in its current form is also closely linked with the exploitation of natural resources and the strong accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, endangering human survival. In economics two fundamentally different solution strategies are discussed as a reaction on man-made climate change and irreversible environmental damages: (1) conservation of resources by growth abstinence and (2) decoupling of growth and exploitation of resources. In this chapter, we show that the first perspective with its emphasis on the efficiency of price competition is not suited to conceive a transformation of the production system towards a knowledge-based bioeconomy. Only the emphasis of the superiority of innovation competition, inherent to the second perspective, allows for the inclusion of the required transformative perspective.

The supporters of the first approach (e.g., Blewitt and Cunningham 2014; Kallis et al. 2014), summarized under the headings of abstinence and downscaling, claim a renunciation of our lifestyles based on consumption and increasing deployment of resources. This is considered the only way to enable a sustainable and environment-friendly lifestyle and form of economic activity. At first sight, it might look surprising that these growth-hostile approaches are strictly in line with the thinking put forward in mainstream neoclassical growth theories. This follows from the fact that the standard neoclassical approach relies on the assumption of stable economic structures and an understanding of economic growth as a continuous increase in the quantity of the goods that are produced. Figure 11.1 depicts the impressive growth performance of the German economy, where—in particular in the period of the so-called Wirtschaftswunder after 1945—income per head skyrocketed: at the beginning of the twenty-first century, per capita GDP is approximately four times higher than three generations earlier. But does this mean that German consumers today have four Volkswagen Beatles in their garages? Obviously not! Today we have completely different goods and services in our consumption baskets, we acquire different competences in universities, we work in different jobs, etc. Restricting economic growth analysis to a quantitative dimension only dismisses these most important qualitative dimensions. Such an analysis can only serve for a very short-term observation.

The alternative approach of neo-Schumpeterian economics (e.g., Hanusch and Pyka 2007) challenges this quantitative orientation and instead emphasizes the importance of qualitative aspects, which make fundamental changes of economic structures over longer periods visible. Without the consideration of the qualitative levels of economic growth, the quantitative figures cannot tell much about the massive technological and socioeconomic developments. The neo-Schumpeterian approach highlights that innovations, market forces, structural change, and urban ways of life are both part of the problem and part of the solution to the sustainability problem. Innovation-triggered development generates both quantitative, i.e., income-increasing growth, and qualitative, i.e., structure-changing development. Only the creative solutions characteristic for capitalistic-organized economies will enable to reform our future economy in the sense of sustainability, thereby supporting the UN’s sustainability goals and simultaneously ensuring growth and development (Mazzucato and Perez 2015).

The central role of innovation in neo-Schumpeterian economics highlights that abstinence in the sense of economic downscaling is neither the first nor the only solution. This does not mean that all ideas of the proponents of the camp are rejected: in perfect accordance, certain past patterns like the high energy intensity of production because of too low oil prices not covering the total environmental costs or so-called planned obsolescence in consumption require urgent adjustments. Especially concepts resulting in a more intensive use of goods and therefore contributing to the economization of resources like the sharing economy or displacing physical goods by digital goods are promising. The same applies for closed-loop material cycles, recycling systems, and intelligent waste avoidance and treatment. These concepts are perfectly applicable to foster learning and behavioral changes on the supply and the demand side. The core idea of neo-Schumpeterian economics, however, is the supply of and demand for new technological solutions within a comprehensive economic transformation process (Geels 2002), i.e., different goods and services are produced and demanded in different, namely, sustainable ways. Exploring and exploiting the technological possibilities of the bioeconomy not only creates new investment opportunities but is also the condition sine qua non for the required socioeconomic and cultural changes. The consumers’ acceptance of bio-based products and their demand are indispensable for a successful transformation. Innovations and changed consumer attitudes are complementary conditions for the creation of a sustainable production system.

Change can be either of an incremental type in terms of small improvements step-by-step along well-known technological trajectories, or it can be fundamental, leading to structural changes and the emergence of new and the disappearance of old industries. To simplify, we assume in this chapter that incremental technological changes are based on existing technological solutions, whereas radical technological changes question major existing production processes. They might lead to massive upheaval in the global production system in the sense of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1943). Because this chapter deals with the fundamental transformation of current production systems, radical technological innovations are in the spotlight which encompass the overcoming of the lock-in situation in fossil fuels (Unruh 2000) and the establishment of a knowledge-based bioeconomy (Pyka 2017; Pyka and Buchmann 2016). Without doubt this transformation process is radical, qualitative, and long term. It was already in Business Cycles, published in 1939, when Schumpeter revitalized Kondratieff’s theory of long waves in order to explain such processes as regular processes in long-term economic development. His illustration of the discontinuous nature of economic development is famous: “Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 64). So far, the literature highlights five long waves: The beginning industrialization around the year 1800 represented the first long wave and was fueled by the steam engine and by cotton processing. Then, starting around the year 1850, the widespread availability of steel and the diffusion of railways constituted a second long wave. Again, in the early twentieth century, this Kondratieff cycle was replaced by electricity and chemicals. In the postwar period, the third long wave gained momentum by mass production and the automobile as well as the petrochemical industries. Since then, manufacturing activities built on oil as a second fossil fuel apart from coal. From the 1980s, one refers to the fifth long wave, which is reflected in the fast and ubiquitous diffusion and application of information and communication technology. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, another paradigmatic change is in the air, being characterized, however, by one major difference to previous situations of radical change: whereas previous cycles were driven by technological bottlenecks and their overcoming, in the twentyfirst century, we face the vital question of how to restore environmental sustainability of economic activities. The knowledge-based bioeconomy plays a key role in this transformation process which, of course, like previous radical changes, still is confronted by fundamental uncertainty (Knight 1921).

The literature provides many alternative terms for the massive change, shaking global production systems: Freeman (1991) and Dosi (1982) call them techno-economic paradigm changes; Sahal (1985) uses cartographic analogies and refers to technological guideposts that are pointing to technological avenues. All authors highlight the confrontation with profound changes economic systems are faced with over longer periods of time, which question all established production approaches. Not a single technology is responsible for this phenomenon but several complementary developments that include, apart from a package of mutually dependent technologies (e.g., combustion engine, petrochemistry, assembly line production), numerous infrastructural developments (e.g., road structure, filling station network), behavioral changes (e.g., suburbs and commuter flow, shopping malls outside the city centers), as well as institutional changes (e.g., spatial planning and commuter allowance, etc.). The old paradigm will not be replaced by the new one until all these elements interact.

The neo-Schumpeterian approach provides us with crucial hints on the process of the forthcoming change. For this purpose, we discuss in the following section how innovations are supported by the discovery and successful diffusion of new knowledge. Knowledge-based economies organize innovation systems composed of different actors which establish a creative environment for mutual learning and knowledge creation. No innovation would have ever been established if it had not attracted consumers’ interest and if it had not been leveraged by their purchasing power. We will focus on these questions in Sect. 11.3. Knowledge-based societies consider new concepts in the sense of responsible innovation that are decisive in bringing an entire economy on a new sustainable path-shaping growth and development. Section 11.4 deals with the massive economic impacts originating from these technological and knowledge-driven changes. It requires, besides technological change, also institutional change in a coevolutionary fashion, if new sustainable technologies are to achieve the aspired transformation of the economic system.

11.2 Innovation Systems and Knowledge

Neo-Schumpeterian scholars (e.g., Dosi et al. 1988; Lundvall 1992, 1998; Nelson 1993) strongly emphasize the systemic character of innovation processes. So-called innovation systems are composed of different actors (companies, research institutions, political actors, consumers, etc.) and linkages between these actors (flows of goods, R&D cooperation, knowledge transfer relationships, user-producer relationships, etc.). These linkages are required to ensure mutual learning and common knowledge development to solve complex innovation challenges. Such systems are characterized by their dynamic and coevolutionary nature and are thus enormously complex, as both actors and their knowledge and linkages and interactions between actors may change over time.

Dosi (1982) takes this systemic conception as a starting point in defining technological paradigms as “[...] set of procedures, or a definition of the ‘relevant’ problems and of the specific knowledge related to their solution.” Transferred to the knowledge-based bioeconomy, the core idea is substitution, i.e., replacing carbon-based materials and energy with bio-based materials and energy. This can only be achieved by applying a variety of technological processes in the entire breadth and depth of the value-added chain. In this process the exploration of economic complementarities in terms of crossfertilization of different knowledge fields matters. For example, to a large extent, digitalization allows for an extension of value chains by increasing the added value in new sustainable production sectors in a CO2-neutral way (e.g., by electric mobility based on renewables, by establishing so-called smart grids, etc.). The concept of technological paradigms also illustrates that a paradigm shift is not possible at any time. A window of opportunity will only occasionally be opened and allow for a paradigm shift when several interconnected technologies are established and the creation of conducive demand side and institutional conditions happens simultaneously. This, of course, also holds for the emergence of a new bioeconomic innovation system and requires a sound balance of the various actors and their activities. For this reason, we introduce the notion of a dedicated innovation system.

The theory of industrial life cycles, which emphasizes the strong dynamics in the emergence and decline of industries, gives a first hint on the meaning of the development of a dedicated innovation system supporting the transformation towards a knowledge-based bioeconomy. Typically, industrial development is divided into four stages: (1) a development phase (new knowledge creates prerequisites for innovation), (2) an entrepreneurial and growth phase (many market entries of smaller innovative firms), (3) a saturation and consolidation phase (formation of industrial standards, mergers, and acquisitions as well as market exits), and (4) a downturn phase (oligopolistic competition in only less innovative industries) (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman 1996). Although the bioeconomy does not represent a well-defined industrial sector, understanding the theory of industrial life cycles is of crucial importance to govern the transformation process towards the knowledge-based bioeconomy. Without doubt, the bioeconomy has to be characterized as cross sectional. On the one hand, several new sectors will emerge, e.g., in the fields of bioplastic, waste management, or biorefineries. On the other hand, already existing sectors in the fields of vehicle construction, battery technology, pharmaceuticals, etc. will gain new momentum by the arrival of bioeconomic approaches. Therefore, we argue that new sectors will emerge by establishing bioeconomic technologies and development dynamics of some already existing industries will receive new impetus at the same time. Adjustments of old and development of new institutions (e.g., in Germany the Renewable Energy Act, the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Law, etc.), adjustments of consumer habits, and the emergence of new educational opportunities in terms of coevolution will accompany these processes and establish the institutional, the industrial, and the consumer pillars of a dedicated innovation system.

The patterns and nature of new businesses in the bioeconomy are thus strongly influenced by national institutions and organizations (Casper et al. 1999; Whitley 1999). Institutions are defined as “a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons.” “Organizations are durable entities with formally recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the institutions of the political economy” (North 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001). In this interplay between organizations and institutions, the knowledge base of an economy is created by the education and research system and represents one of the most important prerequisites for the transformation towards a bioeconomic production system (Geels 2002). This automatically relates to a high level of uncertainty in particular concerning the required future competences. In this complex process, numerous individual knowledge fields are potentially relevant for the transformation and are already identified, e.g., synthetic chemistry, process engineering, genetic engineering, food technology, or informatics. It is decisive to understand the dynamics of these knowledge fields and the possibilities of their recombination with other knowledge fields and adequate actors in order to create an innovation system. In many cases, linkages of different knowledge fields (cross-fertilization) are responsible for the emergence of extensive technological opportunities: for instance, a complete new industry, bioinformatics, has been initiated by the fusion of two so far unrelated knowledge fields, database technology and molecular biology. Because linking different knowledge fields is highly uncertain, private actors might not start and governmental innovation policies matter. Knowledge about future potentials, therefore, is essential for supporting research and innovation policies: the analysis of knowledge and network dynamics allows for the identification of development trajectories showing sectors requiring public attention and support concerning research and development in order to close existing knowledge gaps and build bridges between various knowledge domains (Burt 2004; Zaheer and Bell 2005).

11.3 Innovation in Knowledge-Based Societies

It has already been mentioned that also consumer knowledge plays an important role for the development and establishment of sustainable consumption patterns in a knowledge-based bioeconomy (Geels 2002). Therefore, the analysis of the transformation process has to include the interaction of technological development, demand, and acceptance of innovative solutions as well as sociological variables. The latter include education, age, income, and gender. All are important explanatory factors determining attention and readiness to deal with bioeconomic issues. A bioeconomic innovation will only be successful when consumers accept it. The direction of the transformation process is, comparable to the importance of the policy realm, determined by consumers, i.e., an important question has to address consumers’ openness to the bioeconomy and its products.

Finally, (real and virtual) social networks matter for the establishment of new consumption patterns. They can contribute significantly to a diffusion of consumers’ behavioral patterns and values (Robertson et al. 1996; Valente 1996; Nyblom et al. 2003; Deffuant et al. 2005). Recent studies show that attitudes are substantial for the development of social relationships and that, in turn, social relationships considerably influence behavior and attitudes. In the field of renewable energies, for example, the initiative of municipal utilities’ customers has led in many cases to a “green” orientation of regional power supply. In some cases, citizens’ networks finally transformed to investment companies that are engaged in wind farms.

Critical issues are to be dealt with in democratic processes in order to be widely accepted. Not everything that is technically possible is also socially desirable. In the field of the bioeconomy, this may, for instance, include the use of genetically modified organisms in agriculture. In fact, these organisms promise efficiency advantages with regard to the consumption of land and water, etc., but their long-term health and environmental risks cannot be completely (as with any new technology) anticipated. Accordingly, technological developments require consumers’ acceptance and thus depend on the level of education in an economy. This raises the question of a society’s openness towards innovations that are fundamentally associated with uncertainty. The concept of responsible innovation summarizes the future-oriented organization of development and is currently discussed with a high priority by European policy makers and institutions. A comprehensive working definition has been developed by Von Schomberg (2011). He describes responsible innovation as “a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society).” This means that innovations are not exclusively evaluated by their economic efficiency, but different aspects (e.g., consumer protection or ecological aspects; see Schlaile et al. 2017) also matter and are to be evaluated. Discussions on biofuels (“fuel vs. food”) show that both a pure economic and a one-dimensional ethical perspective are not sufficient. The quality of these discussions depends on the discussants’ mutual understanding which in turn depends on the participants’ level of knowledge.

Modern plant breeding and production of seeds are bioeconomy fields of innovation in which issues of responsibility are discussed frequently and controversially. German consumers are skeptical about interference with the genome of food crops, but individual points of criticism remain unclear. New breeding techniques introduced, e.g., genome editing, enable scientists to selectively modify DNA strands of crop plants. These techniques are considered innovative as they may allow breeding of potentially efficient plants in fast and cheap ways. Species developed this way hardly differ from those of conventional breeding. The Central Advisory Committee for Biological Safety does not classify these techniques as genetic engineering, especially because no new combinations of genetic material are made. As the Genetic Engineering Act does not explicitly address these techniques, legal clarification is still necessary as to whether these techniques are classified as genetic engineering at all. Dissemination potential and acceptance are influenced by this result. Here again, the necessity to include education and information policies becomes evident to support the transformation towards a knowledge-based bioeconomy.

The concept of social innovation (e.g., Hanusch and Pyka 2013) emphasizes the importance of active citizenship in innovation. Thus, according to the understanding of the European Commission, this term includes innovations that are social, both in relation to their objective and their instruments. In particular, this includes innovations referring to the development and the application of new ideas (for products, services, and models), covering at the same time social demand and creating new social relationships or collaborations. The whole society should benefit and contribute to generate new impetus for improvement. Social innovations can make a major contribution to rural development and promote economic resilience in these regions by strengthening cooperative behavior. Rural cooperatives (e.g., regional producer and marketing associations, winegrowers’ cooperatives, tourism associations, etc.) can help to develop regional competitiveness considering ecological and social aspects. As a consequence, within the framework of a bioeconomy, rural regions that are notably affected by the already imminent demographic change and subsequent depopulation receive new opportunities for economic development.

11.4 The Economics of Change

The sections above illustrate that a transformation of the prevailing economic system towards a bioeconomy is an extremely complex process. Various different actors participating in different roles are contributing different pieces of knowledge. In this process, innovative adjustments in already existing industries as well as the emergence of new and the disappearance of mature industries can be observed simultaneously. In addition to the substitutive relations of new bio-based industries to traditional oil-based industries, there are numerous essential complementary relations giving further momentum for the transformation process. First and foremost, there are the possibilities and application fields of digitalization. Digitalization allows to replace many oil-based products and energyintensive services simply by bits and bytes. Simultaneously, digitalization offers a wide range of opportunities by coordinating decentralized and very detailed bioeconomic technologies and processes such as energy production and distribution. This affects the composition of individual sectors where a coexistence of large diversified companies and small highspecialized technology companies is a likely solution. Finally, digitalization also offers consumer platforms to efficiently organize “sharing economy” approaches. Finally, successful knowledge generation and diffusion of relevant bioeconomic knowledge depends on dynamic innovation networks (Pyka 2002) in which different actors jointly share and create new knowledge. The consumers, represented, for example, by consumer associations or politics, will play a key role in these innovation networks and will help to establish networks in early stages of technology development.

In a knowledge-based bioeconomy, investment and economic growth still represent a crucial element for employment, international competitiveness, and income generation. The bioeconomy can make important contributions to accelerate investments by providing new investment opportunities generated by fundamental innovations and thereby bringing currently available large quantities of liquidity to a productive use. This, in turn, accelerates the technological paradigm shift (Pe´rez 2010).

The time path of the transformation process represents another critical component and has been explored only partially so far. On the one hand, it is high time to reduce carbon-based production methods. On the other hand, there will be frictions in the transformation process being caused, for example, by a lack of specialists and required competences. In this context, the so-called sailing ship effects (Howells 2002), frequently observed with radical innovations, could be made of good use. In the middle of the nineteenth century, when the existence of the established sailing ship technology was threatened by the arrival of new steam ships, shipbuilders—not having changed their technologies for many decades, if not centuries—began to innovate again. Due to the threat of innovative technologies, adjustment reactions in predecessor technologies can be observed with the aim to prevent the ancient technologies to be quickly replaced. Such adjustment reactions are, for example, fuel-efficient combustion engines and hybrid technologies as a reaction to the emergence of electric vehicles. These adjustments are advantageous since they pursue the same environmental objectives (e.g., inner-city fine dust and noise reduction, etc.) and thus provide more time to develop new technologies. Accordingly, the transformation process will for longer periods of time feature a coexistence of traditional and bio-based industries. Furthermore, it will be important to concurrently steer the relevant innovation processes in traditional technologies. This coexistence further increases complexity. At the same time, innovation policy is given room for maneuver and yet insufficiently developed technologies are prevented from being introduced prematurely which might cause promising approaches to fail.

Distributional effects of the transformation process are important for social acceptance. A bio-based economy on an industrial scale will largely represent a knowledge-based economy. Consequently, additional demand for highskilled workers arises whereas opportunities for low-skilled workers decrease. This means a potential loss of jobs for less skilled workers in traditional industrial production. But apart from that, there will be demand for different goods and services whose compensation potential with regard to added value and employment is still unclear. Moreover, it remains open to what extent companies are prepared for this transformation into the bioeconomy. Transformation processes will lead to a devaluation of competences so far responsible for economic success. How do established companies deal with the so-called not-invented-here syndrome, overcome operational blindness, and shape transformation processes actively in order to obtain added value at their established locations?

From this follows that distributional effects have an important regional dimension: does the bioeconomy strengthen divergence processes between regions or does it help to achieve more convergence? The approach of creating networks in the sense of the so-called smart specialization principle (Foray et al. 2009), connecting regional strengths along value-added chains in the best possible way, is promising but only sparsely implemented so far. Thus, in general, polarization tendencies leading to economic as well as political and cultural concentration of power and resulting in strong center-periphery structures can be avoided. But it still remains unclear, how strong and operational meaningful politically induced networks are in comparison to self-organized networks and how policy might exert influence. First findings indicate signs of a potential disintegration of the networks when political support is withdrawn (Green et al. 2013).

Transformation towards a knowledge-based bioeconomic production system is supposed to terminate the existing negative relations between economic growth and environmental pollution, use of resources, climate change, and energy consumption and to promote a sustainable economy. The following questions are closely linked to the basic uncertainty of innovation and cannot be answered ex ante: “which contributions are to be made by individual sectors?,” “what complex feedbacks for national and international competitiveness are to be expected?,” and “do the so-called rebound effects possibly reduce or even overcompensate the positive effects of the transformation?” Institutional rules, such as a self-commitment of oil-producing countries to reduce their outputs due to the declining demand caused by bioeconomics, are a way to reduce these uncertainties, at least partly. It remains necessary for the leading actors, companies, households, and policy makers to refrain from optimization approaches and profit maximization in this transformation process. The complexity and uncertainty of this process requires the awareness of all actors to experimental behavior (trial and error) which always also includes the possibility of failure.

#### All environmental indicators prove growth is sustainable.

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The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.

Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future.

To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive.

There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses.

Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.

Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts.

Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.

Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two.

The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.

Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.

Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts.

The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.

As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy.

These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.

Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.

Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century.

Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations.

Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive.

As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies.

Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.

## CAP

#### Local to Global Bad---the question of this debate is which model translates collectives to overcome commoditization of dissent---the perm that scales up from “local” to “global” gets the direction of causality wrong by mystifying how world economies structure local relations---misdiagnosis turns solvency.

Engel-Di Mauro 9---Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

Despite the emphasis on multiple scales of analysis, ‘‘webs of relation” (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007), ‘‘chains of explanation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 27), ‘‘bottom-up” (Blaikie, 1985, p. 82), or ‘‘progressive contextualisation” (Vayda, 1983), most of the work in political ecology privileges spatio-temporally limited social contexts over longer-term, macro-scale social processes (Bridge, 2002, p. 371). While this may be the outcome of a recent distancing from political economy perspectives (Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 611), the problem was inherent from the very beginning, with a tendency to emphasise the ‘‘regional” or meso-scale (and then ‘‘local”, or micro-scale) as the starting unit of analysis. This analytical centring of smaller-scale dynamics has resulted in an inability to integrate general patterns and interconnections with ethnographic and eco- systemic data (Blaikie, 1999, p. 140; Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 612). This is far from saying that micro- or meso-specificity is less important than macro-specificity (the two are equally important in my view). Micro- and meso-level analysis is pivotal in under- standing people–environment relations, especially given that the most tangible occur largely over small areas. Yet emphasis on the smaller scale becomes a hindrance when it guides, rather than builds the empirical foundations of a research project. With few exceptions, political ecology continues to suffer from a methodological insis- tence on explaining people–environment relations through the analysis of smaller-scale circumstances and/or starting points. Planet-wide environmental and, since at least 500 years ago, social processes enable and/or constrain smaller-scale people–environment relations, especially with recent human-induced shifts in atmosphere composition (radiative forcing through greenhouse gas emissions, stratospheric ozone layer disruption through the emissions of bromines and chlorofluorocarbons, regional releases of atmospheric pollutants through burning vegetation and coal com- bustion, etc.). The scale of analysis adopted in a research project may depend on the kind of question one wishes to answer (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 65), but ultimately larger-scale processes must be included to arrive at explanations that go beyond appeals to complexity (Blaikie, 1985) or beyond eclecticism in the frameworks being combined (Blaikie, 1999, p. 139). The matter is exacerbated when phenomena in some parts of the whole are confused for evidence that negates either the existence of the entire system (or of any systemic process at all) or denies the possibility of a general theory on resource management (e.g., Black, 1990; Forsyth, 2003). There are other epistemological repercussions from such small locality-specific analyses and small-to-large scale approaches. One is treating places (or regions) as isolatable (often implicitly, by not paying attention to wider systemic processes), which enabled political ecology to circumscribe the range of social and environmental contexts to those far away from most political ecologists’ homes (McCarthy, 2002; Robbins, 2004). The underlying problem was reflected in the exclusion of places outside rural ‘‘third” world areas from the purview of political ecology (countries in the former state-socialist camp are still mostly ignored).2 Recent attention to wealthy industrialised capitalist societies and urban ecosystems is a helpful first step in moving political ecology away from a relatively narrow focus3 and into more promising cross-comparative terrain that can generate more systematic analy- sis (see works guest edited by Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2006).

#### over-investing in the ballot’s “political force” renders challenges to neolib into local self help.

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Constructivism and the Malleable World.Presumably drawing on the work of Judith Butler (1993, p. 28),5 **Foss, Waters, and Armada argue that orienting oneself as the ‘‘director’’ of one’s life is in tune with a tenet acknowledged by a number of diverse perspectives, ranging from social constructionism to quantum physics. Simply put, it is that symbols create reality*. . . .* Symbolic choices *. . .* can and do affect the structural world*. . . .*** Although the reality of everyday life appears prearranged, ordered, and objective, and therefore outside of agents’ sphere of influence *. . .* the structural world not only ‘‘bears cultural constructions’’ but is itself a construction. (p. 220) **Because the structural world is itself a construction, individuals are capable of changing that world by thinking and making choices about it.** Although the authors acknowledge that ‘‘agents cannot *. . .* lay out precisely the routes through which their desires will be fulfilled,’’ they nevertheless believe that ‘‘desires are realized in outcomes that align with agents’ choices’’ because of the ontological status of the structural world as a construction (p. 220). The key to understanding the ideal of agentic orientation is *full consciousness*: In order to change the construction of the world, one must understand what options are available and put faith in unforeseen possibilities yet to come (pp. 220–221). **Such a position is entirely in keeping with the ‘‘core concept’’ of magic: ‘‘that mind affects matter, and that *. . .* the trained imagination can alter the physical world’’** (Luhrman, p. 7).6 Not surprisingly, Rhonda Byrne also aligns ‘‘The Secret’’ with quantum physics (p. 156); however, constructivism appears in *The Secret* most conspicuously in the guise of ‘‘the law of attraction,’’ which Bob Doyle, ‘‘author and law of attraction specialist,’’ defines simply as ‘‘like attracts like’’ at ‘‘a level of thought.’’ Byrne elaborates: The law of attraction says *like attracts like*, and so as you think a thought, you are also attracting *like* thoughts to you*. . . .* Your life right now is a reflection of your past thoughts. That includes all the great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life . . . Until now! Now you are learning The Secret, and with this knowledge, you can change everything. (pp. 8–9) Changing everything depends on understanding the ontological primacy of attraction, which is best grasped as a form of magnetism (even though magnetism is, in physics, the attraction of *opposites*): ‘‘Thoughts are magnetic, and thoughts have a frequency,’’ explains Byrne. ‘‘As you think, those thoughts are sent out into the Universe, and they magnetically attract all *like* things that are on the same frequency’’ (p. 10). Nevertheless, as with Foss, Waters, and Armada, Byrne and her army of specialists insist on the constructedness of reality and the mutability of structure. ‘‘Time,’’ for example, is just an illusion: Einstein told us that. If this is the first time you have heard it, you may find it a hard concept to get your head around*. . . .* What quantum physicists and Einstein tell us is that everything is happening simultaneously*. . . .* It takes no time for the Universe to manifest what you want. Any time delay you experience is due to your delay in getting to the place of believing, knowing, and feeling that you already have it. (p. 63) The concept of temporality is used here to teach readers a certain version of constructivism, which is similar to the version Foss, Waters, and Armada advance in their reading of *Run Lola Run*: all three runs in the film happen at the same time, but reflect different levels of believing, knowing, and feeling. Once Lola understood the mutability of reality and the power of her manipulation of symbols, she could magically bend the laws of the Universe for money**. Similarly, Byrne writes, ‘‘[i]t’s as easy to manifest one dollar as it is to manifest one million dollars’’ if you simply have the right mindset (p. 68). Although we do not dismiss certain forms of constructivist thought, it is important to detail the consequence or ‘‘outcome’’ of choosing magical voluntarism. Both *The Secret* and Foss, Waters, and Armada invoke physics to argue that structural change is possible for *anything you desire* through conscious thought and choice.** Hence, magical voluntarism denies that some material and social conditions are not changeable: Agentic orientations *. . .* are achieved within, rather than simply given by, the conditions of individuals’ lives. Thus, individuals may be in a dominant position as defined by economic and other structural conditions or in a subordinate position as defined by a lack of access to such resources, *but they may choose any agentic orientation and produce any outcome they desire*. We acknowledge that such a view may be difficult to accept in extreme cases such as imprisonment or genocide; even in these situations, however, agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency. Even in these situations, adoption of the agentic orientation of director opens up opportunities for innovating in ways unavailable to those who construct *themselves* as victims. (p. 223, emphasis added) In other words, the starving prisoner in a concentration camp should choose the director orientation and dream-up the possibility of her liberation or escape.7 Aside from the offensiveness of such a perspective on imprisonment and genocide, what is **the *outcome* of adopting this ontological view about ‘‘structural’’ conditions? *The Secret* is quite clear on the answer:** narcissistic complacency**. ‘‘Anything we focus on we do create,’’ explains Hale Dwoskin, ‘‘so if we’re** really angry**, for instance, at a war that’s going on, or strife or suffering, we’re adding our energy to it’’ (pp. 141–142). So although the rhetoric of magic exemplified by *The Secret* acknowledges structural injustice, it gets explained away in mystical terms that urge the reader to turn her back to the world and seek within.** The video and book openly discourage social protest, invoking Carl Jung’s phrase, ‘‘what you resist persists’’ (p. 142). ‘‘Don’t give energy to what you don’t want,’’ intones one of the video’s ‘‘teachers.’’ For example, the DVD segment on wealth begins with black-and-white footage of sweatshop laborers in dreary factories, but sweatshops are a mere blip on the screen. Immediately, the text explains that today one can be free from such exploitation and drudgery simply by wishing for money.8 The real world outcome of the constructivism that supports magical voluntarism is ultimately selfish inaction. ‘‘You cannot help the world by focusing on the negative things,’’ says Byrne. ‘‘When I discovered The Secret I made a decision that I would not watch the news or read newspapers anymore, because it did not make me feel good’’ (pp. 144–145). Although professional scholars in the United States may be buffered from some of the vagaries of economic crisis and barriers to achievement, there are, in fact—as opposed to the fantasy of a filmic game or magnetizing your desires into reality—millions of people around the world who cannot wish away the ‘‘conditions, people, or events external to them’’ (p. 209). Nongovernmental organizations, grassroots banks and crafts projects, and other forms of localized ‘‘self-help’’ can do little to curtail the broader abuses of capitalist globalization. But Foss, Waters, and Armada chastise critical postcolonial scholars Radha Hegde and Raka Shome, as if the (magical) options available to a fictional Lola actually apply to sweatshop workers in India (p. 223). Similarly, The Secret encourages readers to turn on to the law of attraction and stop resisting injustice: ‘‘The antiwar movement creates more war,’’ explains Jack Canfield (quoted in Byrne, p. 142). Shockingly, however, Foss, Waters, and Armada carry their magical voluntarism beyond the fuzzy magnetism of The Secret to a most extreme conclusion: Symbolic choices, Run Lola Run argues, can and do affect the structural world. We acknowledge that a belief in this tenet is disputable in the presence of certain kinds of conditions, but **we ask our readers to consider seriously** for a moment . . .**the possibility that it might be true under all conditions.** (p. 220) **Even in the contexts of *famine and genocide***, Foss, Waters, and Armada believe that **changing one’s interpretation of events is the correct strategy**, especially because ‘‘what you resist, persists.’’ While demonstrably different, both their article and ***The Secret* counsel passivity**—implicitly and explicitly respectively—in the face of the most brutal exploitation and oppression, letting the purveyors of inequality off the hook for **their actions, urging millions to think positively in the face of their immiseration.9**

## CASE

Independently, extinction is the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 17 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

That is the only egalitarian metric---anything else collapses cooperation on collective action crises and makes extinction inevitable

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

#### Growth is good and there’s no transition---industrial ag feeds billions and degrowth won’t persuade anybody.

Collin Chambers 21. Writer for the Liberation School. "Degrowth: An environmental ideology with good intentions, bad politics." Liberation School. 7-20-2021. https://liberationschool.org/degrowth-a-politics-for-which-class/

Proponents of degrowth argue that there are absolute “planetary limits” and a fixed “carrying capacity” that cannot be surpassed by humans if we want to avoid ecological collapse. This is not only pessimistic in that it dismisses the idea that, under socialism, we could figure out new sustainable ways to grow, but it’s also completely devoid of class analysis. There’s no distinction between socially-produced limits and natural limits.

Degrowth is anti-modern, anti-technological, and anti-large scale production and infrastructure. Kallis argues that “only social systems of limited size and complexity can be governed directly rather than by technocratic elites acting on behalf of the populace… Many degrowth advocates, therefore, oppose even ‘green’ megastructures like high-speed trains or industrial-scale wind farms[!]” [13].

The same can be said about degrowth solutions to the problems the capitalist agricultural system creates. Proponents of degrowth propose small scale (both urban and rural) methods of agriculture production to replace industrial-scale agriculture. They, in fact, glorify and romanticize “peasant economies.”

Despite the problems of capitalist industrial agriculture, there are two main benefits of industrial-scale agriculture. First, it has drastically increased yields. At the present moment, there is enough food produced to feed 11 billion people. Second, industrial farming has thoroughly decreased the backbreaking labor needed for agricultural and food production. In 1790, 90 percent of the U.S. workforce labored on farms. In 1900, it was 35 percent[.] At the present moment, only one percent of the U.S. workforce works on farms [14].

Certainly, in any just society we would want to spread out food production more evenly amongst the population. But getting rid of industrial-scale agriculture and reverting to small-scale peasant and small landowner agriculture would require massive numbers of workers to go back to the land and perform backbreaking agricultural work. Such a transformation would inevitably reduce agricultural yield substantially, increasing the possibility of food insecurity and hunger among vast swathes of the population. And what would we do with the commodities and infrastructure we’d have to destroy to create such plots of land? Moreover, such a vision necessitates the redistribution of land from private ownership of large landholders. Is this achieved through revolution or through governmental reforms? In either case, if we’re struggling to reclaim land then why not broaden our horizons and redistribute land in the interests of the environment and the people, including Indigenous and other oppressed nations in the U.S.?

Degrowth is, furthermore, idealist and divorced from the material reality within which U.S. workers currently live. Matt Huber, a Marxist environmental geographer, argues that a “truly humane society must commit to relieving the masses from agricultural labor,” and that we cannot act as if “small-scale agricultural systems are much of a ‘material basis’ for a society beyond industrial capitalism” [15]. This is not to say that small-scale and urban farming are undesirable, but that they’re insufficient in a country like the U.S. The Cuban model of urban farming and agriculture–which is a heroic achievement of the Cuban Revolution–can’t simply be mapped onto this country or the rest of the world.

Additionally, we shouldn’t forgo modern technologies that already exist just because they are “large scale” or because they currently contribute to environmental degradation within capitalist society. Doing so would in effect produce more ecological waste!

In an important piece on capitalism and ecology, Ernest Mandel writes: “it is simply not true that modern industrial technology is inevitably geared towards destroying the environmental balance. The progress of the exact sciences opens up a very wide range of technical possibilities” [16]. Increased rates of pollution and environmental degradation occur because capitalists pursue profits at the expense of the environment, not because of the technologies themselves. Socialists have to distinguish between instruments of production and their use under capitalism.

Degrowth and building the class struggle

In the U.S., degrowth remains an ideology that is relatively socially isolated but gaining influence among environmentalists and some on the left. It’s an ideology of guilt rather than revolutionary action. The ideas from degrowth will not appeal to masses of exploited and oppressed people who actually need more, not less. Imagine, for example, canvassing and talking to people in working-class neighborhoods, trying to get them on board with a degrowth political platform. How do degrowth proponents think workers in oppressed neighborhoods respond if they were told they needed to consume less to fight climate change? Many of us already wait as long as possible in the winter to turn on our heat! As organizers, we would not get the time of day, and we wouldn’t even believe ourselves. Can you imagine organizing homeless and unemployed workers around a program of less consumption? Degrowth is an ideology fit for the privileged, and if they want to consume less, they should.

From the perspective of the practical class struggle, degrowth is particularly problematic. Degrowth has a rhetorical strategy problem. In an unequal country such as the U.S., is the discourse of less and “self-limitation” realistic and inspiring? Is this tactic energizing, does it speak to the needs of the exploited and oppressed, can it mobilize people into action?

#### Growth solves poverty---the world’s been getting better---poverty and literacy rates prove.

Dylan Matthews 19. Senior Correspondent for Vox. "Bill Gates tweeted out a chart and sparked a huge debate about global poverty." Vox. 2-12-2019. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/12/18215534/bill-gates-global-poverty-chart

So the share of humanity in extreme poverty — measured at either a $1.90 a day or $7.40 line — is falling. People below either line are also doing better in terms of poverty; they have more money, are spending more, etc. But there’s more to life than measurable consumption, ending $7.40-a-day poverty will take many many decades, and there’s more we could do to speed up that process.

While not included in the Hickel-Kenny consensus document, I would note that Hickel agrees with Gates, Pinker, Roser, etc. that some material living standards outside of poverty and consumption have improved in recent decades. According to the UN Population Division’s numbers (compiled by Our World in Data, naturally), life expectancy in China rose from only 43 years in 1950 to 76 in 2015 (in a fact convenient to no one but Bob Avakian’s politics, it even grew while Mao was killing tens of millions of people). India’s life expectancy grew from 35 to 68 over the same period; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it grew from 38 to 59. Likewise, literacy rates and years of schooling have increased.

“Yes, of course I agree that life expectancy has increased and child mortality has decreased,” Hickel wrote in an email to me. “Those data are not controversial, although I differ from Gates and Pinker in my assessment of the causes of those improvements. … As for the graphs on literacy and years of schooling: the data are accurate, but I believe these are very narrow indicators of education, and that a broader, more holistic view reveals a more complicated story.”

In his letter to Pinker, too, Hickel agrees that life expectancy and education have seen gains. “In your work you have invoked gains in life expectancy and education as part of a narrative that seeks to justify neoliberal globalization,” Hickel writes. “But ... that’s intellectually dishonest. What contributes most to improvements in life expectancy is in fact simple public health interventions (sanitation, antibiotics, vaccines), and what matters for education is, well, public education.”

So while there is obviously vociferous disagreement about what political narrative the facts on life expectancy and education supports, everyone appears to agree that the world has made major progress on both.

### AT: Financialization

#### Financial markets are key to a net-zero economy---it’s the only sector capable of supporting the transition.

Gill Lofts and Mark Watson 21. Gill Lofts is the EY Global Financial Services Sustainable Finance Leader, EY Financial Services Wealth & Asset Management Leader, Ernst & Young LLP United Kingdom. Mark Watson is the EY Americas Financial Services Managing Director and Board Matters Deputy Leader. “How can sustainable finance support the road to net-zero?How can sustainable finance support the road to net-zero?” EY. 1/19/2021.https://www.ey.com/en\_sg/financial-services/how-can-sustainable-finance-support-the-road-to-net-zero

In light of increasing pressure from investors, regulators and society, sustainable finance is gathering significant momentum globally. Once regarded as a niche and futuristic concept within aspects of the investment community, it is rapidly becoming an immediate-term strategic priority and operational reality for all types of financial services players. Putting COVID-19 aside, over the next decade, sustainable finance might become the most pressing challenge and opportunity for the industry.

Sustainable finance can mean different things in different contexts. EY defines sustainable finance as any form of financial service that incentivizes the integration of long-term environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria into business decisions, with the goal of providing more equitable, sustainable and inclusive benefits to companies, communities and society. Embedding ESG concepts into investing is perhaps the highest-profile manifestation of sustainable finance, alongside the rising prominence of stakeholder or inclusive capitalism. Sustainable finance also has a critical role to play relative to climate change in financing the transition to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.

The magnitude of climate change globally presents an enormous range of potential risks, starting with floods, wildfires, super-storms and other physical events that not only disrupt economic activity on a broad scale, but the operations of individual companies. Changing weather patterns globally had already started to show the fragility of supply chains for certain industries; COVID-19 certainly exposed that even more. So-called transition risks are equally important. They involve the financial and commercial impacts of the shift to a greener economy (e.g., oil and gas companies affected by limits on fossil fuels). While physical risk is more visible and present today, the growing effects of transition risk over the coming decade and beyond must also be taken into account.

There is no road to a net-zero economy without financial services. Other sectors will need support – such as insurance and funding – to manage the impact of physical risks, and more importantly to change their strategies, business models and operations to make the transition. Brown only turns to green with finance. The financing needs are enormous. Conversely, companies not making the transition will find it harder to gain funding and attract investments. Customers will also be affected, especially those in areas that are subject to the increasing effects of extreme weather.

#### Degrowth fails---COVID recession proves.

C.J. Polychroniou interviewing Robert Pollin 21. Political scientist/political economist, author, and journalist who has taught and worked in numerous universities and research centers in Europe and the United States; Distinguished professor of economics and co-director of the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. "Degrowth Policies Cannot Avert Climate Crisis. We Need a Green New Deal." Truthout. 6-28-2021. https://truthout.org/articles/degrowth-policies-cannot-avert-climate-crisis-we-need-a-green-new-deal/?amp

In focusing on some critical specifics, I would also add that there is no way that a general project of degrowth can put the global economy onto a viable climate stabilization path. With the COVID-19 recession, the global economy just went through a powerful natural experiment to demonstrate this point. That is, during the pandemic in 2020, the global economy contracted by 3.5 percent, which the International Monetary Fund described as a “severe collapse … that has had acute adverse impacts on women, youth, the poor, the informally employed and those who work in contact-intensive sectors.” In other words, the pandemic produced an intense period of global “degrowth.” This recession did also produce a decline in emissions, as entire sections of the global economy were forced into lockdown mode. But the emissions decline amounted to only 6.4 percent over 2020. Remember, the IPCC tells us that we need to cut emissions by 45 percent as of 2030 and be at zero emissions by 2050. If the COVID recession only yields a 6.4 percent emissions reduction despite the enormous levels of economic pain inflicted, clearly “degrowth” cannot come close, on its own, to delivering a 45-percent emissions cut by 2030, much less a zero emissions global economy by 2050.

#### It fails---doesn’t solve emissions.

Kelsey Piper 21. Staff Writer for Vox's new vertical with a focus on the global poor, animal welfare, and risks affecting a stable future for our world. "Can we save the planet by shrinking the economy?" Vox. 8-3-2021. https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/future-perfect/22408556/save-planet-shrink-economy-degrowth

One big problem with degrowth is this simple fact: In the coming decades, most carbon emissions won’t be coming from rich countries like the US — they’ll be happening in newly middle-income countries, like India, China, or Indonesia. Already, developing nations account for 63 percent of emissions, and they’re expected to account for even more as they develop further and as the rich world decarbonizes.

Even if emissions in rich countries go to zero very soon, climate change is set to worsen as poorer countries increase their own emissions.

That will, of course, have deeply negative climate impacts. But the alternative is a nonstarter — should the world really prioritize curbing emissions and economic growth if it meant suppressing the growth of those countries?

Degrowthers see no dilemma here. What Hickel envisions is global movement in two directions: Poor countries could develop up to a certain level of prosperity and then stop; rich countries could develop down to that level and then stop. Thus, climate catastrophe could be averted, all while making the world’s poor more prosperous.

“Rich countries urgently need to reduce their excess energy and resource use to sustainable levels so our sisters and brothers in the global South can live well too,” Hickel put it. “We live on an abundant planet and we can all flourish on it together, but to do so we have to share it more fairly, and build economies that are designed around meeting human needs rather than around perpetual growth.”

From a climate change perspective, though, there’s a problem. First, it means that degrowth would do nothing about the bulk of emissions, which are occurring in developing countries.

Second, the global economy is more interconnected than Hickel implies. When Covid-19 hit, poor countries were devastated not just by the virus but by the aftershocks of virus-induced slowdowns in consumption in rich countries.

There’s some genuine appeal to the idea of an end to “consumerism,” but the pandemic offered a taste of how a sudden drop in rich-world consumption would actually affect the developing world. Covid-19 dramatically curtailed Western imports and tourism for a time. The consequences in poor countries were devastating. Hunger rose, and child mortality followed.

Covid-19, of course, wreaked direct economic havoc at the same time, with lockdowns having an especially negative impact on some poor countries; the effects of the pandemic and international demand shock were combined, and in some cases they’re hard to separate. But the United Nations, the World Bank, and expert analyses point to the decline in global consumption as a significant part of the picture.

Degrowthers reject this concern on two fronts: First, they argue that a sustained, deliberate reduction in consumption wouldn’t be anything like a recession. Recessions, they agree, are really bad, but that’s because consumption falls in affected sectors, instead of being targeted at things that don’t improve well-being. Degrowth, they say, would be different.

Second, they contend that there is some path to economic growth in poor countries that doesn’t rely on trade with rich ones — certainly some countries managed economic growth when the whole world was poor, after all.

Hickel’s perspective is that most trade between rich and poor countries is extractive, not mutually beneficial — and that maybe when that dynamic ceases, poor countries will have the chance for the catch-up growth they merit. That’s one take. But it means that degrowth’s case for not crushing the poor world is predicated on a speculative take on how those countries can grow — one that democratically elected leaders in those countries largely don’t share.